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QUANTUM OF EVIDENCE & 
DEGREE OF CERTAINTY
 
ost of the cases in this 
issue deal in some way 
with the concept of 
r e a s o n a b l e g r o u n d s . 
Please read them carefully 
to see what they are telling 
you. Our justice system labours on the 
premise that the party who accuses or alleges must 
offer proof. 
In a criminal trial, the burden of proof falls on the 
Crown to prove the case against an accused beyond a 
reasonable doubt. This criminal standard need not 
reach absolute certainty and applies to the final 
determination of guilt or innocence, not to individual 
pieces of evidence. In some cases this standard is 
also used in other contexts, such as determining  the 
voluntariness of confessions. Prosecution services 
have also recognized this high watermark by 
implementing  policy to guide their lawyers on 
deciding  whether charges should be laid or whether 
to continue with a prosecution. Depending  on the 
prosecution service involved, these policy based 
standards can range from the highest, a substantial 
likelihood of conviction in British Columbia, to a 
reasonable prospect of conviction (Ontario), a 
reasonable likelihood of conviction (Alberta), or a 
realistic prospect of conviction (Nova Scotia).
 
In civil cases, the burden falls on the plaintiff to prove 
the case against a defendant on a balance of 
probabilities. This civil standard, also known as a 
preponderance of the evidence or a more likely than 
not threshold, also has other applications in law aside 
from attributing  liability, such as deciding  preliminary 
questions pertaining to the admissibility of evidence. 
Like both the criminal and civil standards at the trial 
stage, there are other legal standards recognized at 
law during  the early stages of an investigation, i.e. 
reasonable grounds. And in the law enforcement 
world this ‘reasonable grounds’ term informs both a 
belief threshold (eg. the standard justifying  an arrest, 
search warrant, or breathalyzer demand) and a 
suspicion threshold (eg. the standard justifying  an 
investigative detention, a canine sniff, or an ASD 
demand).
 
In determining  whether reasonable grounds exists, 
courts have clearly enunciated an analysis having  a 
two-prong  test. There are both subjective and 
objective elements. Under the first prong  of the 
analysis, the officer must subjectively—and genuinely
—believe he or she has reasonable grounds. In the 
mind of the officer, he or she must be satisfied that 
reasonable grounds exists. This subjective belief 
relates to what is in the mind of the officer when a 
power (such as search, detention, or arrest) is 
exercised. If the judge is not satisfied that the officer 
had the necessary subjective element, the police 
power exercised is, for that reason, unlawful; whether 
or not the objective test is satisfied is irrelevant to the 
legality of the arrest, for example. What the officer 
could have done doesn’t count (except maybe 
perhaps in a s.24(2) analysis).
 
Under the second prong  of the analysis, the grounds 
must be objectively established. The objective test is 
whether a reasonable person, standing  in the shoes of 
the officer, would have believed that reasonable 
grounds existed. This objective standard recognizes 
that the exercise of police powers must be subjected 
to the detached, independent, and neutral scrutiny of 
a court that must evaluate the reasonableness of the 
police action in light of the particular circumstances 
that were apparent to the officer. This serves to avoid 
and provide a safeguard 
M
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the Justice Institute of 
British Columbia Police 
Academy are hosting  the Police Leadership 2011 
Conference in Vancouver, British Columbia. This 
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aga ins t a rb i t ra ry and 
indiscriminate police action and to prevent the 
officer from being  the ultimate judge of their own 
decision. This objective standard also imposes a 
responsibility on the police to act with restraint and 
after careful assessment; ensuring  police discretion 
is sufficiently constrained. Intuition, for example, is 
insufficient since there is no objective, or factual 
basis upon which a court can assess the intuition. 
Similarly, a mere suspicion or assumption will not 
qualify as objectively reasonable, nor do police 
feelings,  hunches or Spidey senses.
Continued from cover.
Enjoy the read.
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HELICOPTER OBSERVATION OF 
GREENHOUSES USING ZOOM 
CAMERA NOT A ‘SEARCH’
R. v. Kwiatkowski, 2010 BCCA 124
 
While conducting  a routine search 
from a police helicopter for outdoor 
marihuana grow operations at an 
altitude in excess of 1,000 feet (the 
minimum altitude for aircraft flying 
over “built-up” areas), police spotted a property with 
greenhouses situated in a suspiciously remote 
location. The property was a large rural acreage with 
a residence and several other outbuildings situated 
near the front of the property.  The 
greenhouses were situated at the rear 
of the property in a clearing  that was 
sheltered and partially obscured by a 
stand of trees. The helicopter flew 
around the property, but not over it, 
at a radius of one-half mile. Using  a 
zoom lens available from a retail 
outlet, police could see plants with a 
distinctive green colour through the 
translucent walls of the greenhouses 
and observed, from one angle, a 
plant thought to be marihuana 
through an open door of one of the 
greenhouses. The next day, and again 
five days later, police flew around the 
property to take more pictures.  A 
te lewar ran t was success fu l l y 
obtained to search the house, 
outbuildings and property using  the 
aerial surveillance, information from 
po l i ce da tabase s , and o the r 
information. 
While executing  the warrant, officers approached 
the clearing  where the greenhouses were located 
and saw marihuana plants inside the greenhouses.  
They also saw the accused inside one of the 
greenhouses with a garden hose in his hand. Police 
entered the greenhouse with their guns drawn, 
identified themselves and said they had a search 
warrant.  The accused was ordered to the ground, 
handcuf fed , and a r res ted fo r mar ihuana 
production.  Another man was also arrested at 
gunpoint. The residence was cleared and the 
property was searched; police seized about 
3,000  marihuana plants from five greenhouses, 
which were capable of producing  381  pounds of 
marihuana. The wholesale value was $573,000, with 
a potential for three crops per year. During  the 
search and inventory of the greenhouses, police cut 
open the plastic side walls of the greenhouses for 
ventilation. The search of the garage resulted in the 
seizure of equipment suitable for use in an indoor 
grow operation and 89 marihuana clone plants. The 
residence was searched and identification in the 
accused’s name was seized together with 772 grams 
of dried marihuana, scales, plastic baggies and a 
heat-sealing machine.
At trial in British Columbia 
Provincial Court the judge ruled 
that the aerial observation and 
photographs taken using  a zoom 
lens was not “any different than 
the use of binoculars or, to 
return to the highway patrol 
analogy, police use of radar on a 
public highway. At no time was 
the notional airspace of the 
subject property intruded upon 
by the police,” said the judge. 
“There is no privacy interest that 
the defendants can claim in 
re la t ion to a neighbour ' s 
airspace.” Since the accused had 
no standing  to advance a s.8 
Charter claim there was no 
search. 
The judge also ruled that the manner of the 
execution of the search warrant was not 
unreasonable. “There is no authority for the 
requirement that an announcement be made as soon 
as police set foot on a property,” he said. “Police 
executing  a search warrant can set up members at 
various exits to a residence prior to knocking  and 
demanding  entry. Rationale behind the 'knock and 
announce' rule is to announce to the householder 
the arrival of police and give him or her an 
opportunity to open the door voluntarily. It is 
“[The aerial] surveillance did 
not intrude on the 
[accused’s] reasonable 
expectation of privacy and it 
is not necessary to consider 
whether it was violated by 
police conduct. Furthermore, 
since s. 8 is not engaged, the 
police were not obliged to 
obtain a warrant to conduct 
an aerial “search”. 
Therefore, the search did 
not infringe his s. 8 Charter 
rights.”  
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difficult to envision what sort of knock police would 
be required to make when entering  a rural acreage. 
Perhaps defence is suggesting  a form of 'hallooing' 
to alert those on the property that the police are on 
the way. Not only has this procedure not been 
mandated by any court, but there are the 
disadvantages of giving  accused persons an 
opportunity to flee, to dispose of evidence, or to set 
up an ambush.” As for the damage to the 
greenhouses, the cutting  of the plastic walls was 
incidental to the search and seizure and was not 
gratuitous or spiteful. The accused was convicted of 
unlawfully producing  and possessing  marihuana for 
the purpose of trafficking.
The accused then challenged the lower court ruling 
appealed to the British Columbia Court of Appeal 
arguing, among  other grounds, that the police were 
required to obtain a general warrant under s.487.01 
of the Criminal Code before conducting  the aerial 
surveillance of the property using  a telephoto zoom 
lens. As well, the manner of the execution of the 
search warrant (no-knock, weapons drawn, and 
unnecessary damage in cutting  the walls) was also 
challenged.
The Aerial “Search”
The Court of Appeal rejected the accused’s 
submission that he had an expectation of privacy 
over the property he was occupying  and that the 
technology used by the police permitting  them to 
observe and photograph his fields and greenhouses 
from a height of 1,000 feet amounted, to a s.8  of the 
Charter violation. Using  the totality of the 
circumstances approach, Justice Kirkpatrick, 
delivering  the opinion of the court, found the 
accused did not have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy. 
Subject matter of the aerial surveillance: the 
subject matter of the aerial surveillance was the 
greenhouses and not the dwelling  house located on 
the property. The greenhouses were constructed with 
opaque or translucent plastic walls which permitted 
limited viewing  of their interior. The photographs 
were taken from adjacent airspace at an altitude of 
at least 1,000 feet, the minimum height for aircraft 
flying  over built-up areas, although the property was 
located in a rural area that would have allowed for 
fly-overs at 500 feet. The photographs and visual 
surveillance permitted the police to observe the lay-
out of the property and buildings and to observe the 
distinctive green colour of the plants seen in the 
greenhouses.
The accused’s direct interest in the subject matter 
of the surveillance: the Crown conceded that the 
accused had a direct interest in the subject matter of 
the surveillance since he occupied the private 
property on which the greenhouses were located.
The accused’s subjective expectation of privacy: 
the accused did not testify and there was no 
evidence from him that he had a subjective 
expectation of privacy in the greenhouses. Although 
“information about what happens inside the home is 
regarded by the occupants as private,” this was not a 
person’s home, which has long  been held to be a 
place protected from state intrusion. Instead they 
were translucent non-residential structures located a 
long  distance from the residence with no actual road 
leading to it.
Was there an objectively reasonable expectation 
of privacy?
i. The place where the alleged search occurred. 
the police did not enter onto the private 
property of the accused or even over it.  The 
focus of the surveillance was not the accused’s 
home and revealed nothing  in respect of the 
home other than its location on the property.
ii. Was the subject matter in  public view? The 
greenhouses were visible from the air and 
anyone in an airplane, helicopter, or other 
aerial device would have been able to see 
what the police observed and photographed. 
Anyone using  binoculars would have seen 
what the police saw and the zoom lens 
employed by the police was readily available 
at retail stores. It was not advanced or unique 
technology and did not permit the police to 
determine what activities were taking  place 
inside the greenhouses that were not 
otherwise observable given the translucent 
walls of the structures. Additionally, the police 
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were able to see a marihuana plant through a 
greenhouse door that was left open. Thus, the 
plant was in public view.
iii. Was the information already in the possession 
of third parties? The information was not 
already in the hands of third parties, although 
it could have easily been if anyone flew over 
the property with binoculars or a camera.
iv. Was the police technique intrusive in relation 
to the privacy interest? Aerial surveillance of 
the greenhouses from a neighbouring  airspace 
could not be considered intrusive.  
v. Was the use of surveillance technology itself 
objectively unreasonable? The surveillance 
technology used (a camera with zoom 
capability) was not extraordinarily powerful, 
technologically advanced, or any more 
sophisticated than binoculars.  It was not 
capable of seeing  “through” walls except to 
the extent that greenhouses must admit light 
and therefore have increased visibility.  There 
was nothing  objectively unreasonable in the 
police use of this technology.
vi. Did the surveillance technology expose any 
intimate details of the accused’s lifestyle or 
part of his core biographical data? It was the 
cons t ruc t i on ma te r i a l u sed f o r t he 
greenhouses that permitted the police 
surveillance to see the activity occurring  in the 
greenhouses. It was not the 
t e c h n o l o g y t h a t w a s 
particularly advanced or 
intrusive.  It did not reveal the 
kind of private activities that 
the courts are concerned with 
protecting  from observation in 
dwelling  houses or other 
private structures. 
Justice Kirkpatrick noted:
The aerial surveillance in this case 
cannot realistically be likened to a 
warrantless perimeter search or a 
trespass.  In my opinion, the 
surveillance did not intrude on the 
[accused’s] reasonable expectation of privacy 
and it is not necessary to consider whether it 
was violated by police conduct.  Furthermore, 
since s. 8  is not engaged, the police were not 
obliged to obtain a warrant to conduct an aerial 
“search”. Therefore, the search did not infringe 
his s. 8 Charter rights. [para. 41]
“No-Knock”
The accused unsuccessfully contended that the 
search was unreasonable because the police failed 
to comply with the “knock-notice” rule. In citing 
previous case law, the Court of Appeal stated the 
“knock-notice” rule as follows:
Except in exigent circumstances, the police 
officers must make an announcement prior to 
entry.  There are compelling  considerations for 
this.  An unexpected intrusion of a man's 
property can give rise to violent incidents. It is in 
the interests of the personal safety of the 
householder and the police as well as respect for 
the privacy of the individual that the law 
requires, prior to entrance for search or arrest, 
that a police officer identify himself and request 
admittance.  
This rule, the Court of Appeal noted, derives from 
the principle “that a person’s home is protected from 
the forces of the Crown.” The emphasis has always 
been on the sanctity of the home or dwelling  house 
and the police duty to announce their presence and 
purpose before forcing  entry into a dwelling  house. 
Bu t he re , the p r ivacy 
interests protected by the 
knock-notice rule did not 
extend to the entry of the 
greenhouses. Although the 
Court did not rule out a 
defence suggestion that it 
m i g h t b e a f e a s i b l e 
alternative in another case 
for the police to first present 
themselves and the warrant 
at the dwelling  house on the 
property, secure it, and then 
move to secure and search 
the remaining  buildings on 
the property, the failure of 
“Except in exigent circumstances, 
the police officers must make an 
announcement prior to entry. ... It 
is in the interests of the personal 
safety of the householder and 
the police as well as respect for 
the privacy of the individual that 
the law requires, prior to 
entrance for search or arrest, 
that a police officer identify 
himself and request admittance.”  
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the police to knock and announce their presence 
before entering  the greenhouse did not render the 
search unreasonable: 
[I]n this case the object of the police search 
were greenhouses on a large rural property a 
long distance from the dwelling house. A related 
object was of course the arrest of persons 
tending the grow operation.  The police did not 
force entry into the greenhouse.  [The officer] 
walked through the open door and announced 
his presence.  To require the police to first alert 
persons working in or around the greenhouses 
was ... impractical and an invitation to those 
present to flee, destroy evidence, or set up an 
ambush. [para. 58]
Drawing Firearms
The accused’s contention that the police acted 
unreasonably in drawing  their firearms in the 
absence of any specific concerns for officer safety 
and no evidence that anyone associated with the 
property had a history of violence or was likely to be 
armed was also rejected. “The police were executing 
a warrant at a large marihuana grow operation in a 
rural area with an unknown number of persons 
tending  or protecting  the operation,” said Justice 
Kirkpatrick.  “To ignore the modern realities of the 
dangers associated with sophisticated illicit 
operations such as this one would, in my opinion, 
be extremely naive.  The police arrest of the 
[accused] and his co-accused using  drawn weapons 
was not, in these circumstances, unreasonable.”
Damaging the Greenhouses
The actions of the police in cutting  the plastic walls 
to ventilate the greenhouses was neither gratuitous 
nor spiteful.  “The execution of search warrants, 
particularly of marihuana grow operations, will 
inevitably result in some damage,” said the Court.  
The actions of the police did not render the 
execution of the search warrant unreasonable.
Since there were no Charter breaches it was 
unnecessary to consider s. 24(2) of the Charter.   The 
accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
WHAT’S NEW FOR POLICE IN 
THE LIBRARY
The Justice Institute of British Columbia Library is an 
excellent resource for learning. Here is a list of it’s 
most recent acquisitions which may be of interest to 
police. 
Community response to marijuana grow 
operations: a guide towards promising practices. 
Len Garis ... [et al.].
[Surrey, B.C.]: City of Surrey; [Abbotsford, B.C.]: 
University of the Fraser Valley, 2009.
HV 5822 M3 C667 2009.
Crime and justice : a review of research. Volume 
38. 
edited by Michael Tonry.
Chicago, Ill. : University of Chicago Press ; Bristol : 
University Presses Marketing [distributor], 2009.
HV 6001 C672 2009
Ethics for criminal justice professionals.
Cliff Roberson, Scott Mire.
Boca Raton, FL : CRC Press/Taylor & Francis, c2010.
HV 9950 R627 2010
Handbook of psychology of investigative 
interviewing : current developments and future 
directions.
edited by Ray Bull, Tim Valentine and Tom Williamson.
Chichester, UK; Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009.
HV 8073 H258 2009
Responding to marijuana grow operations: a 
community handbook.
[Surrey, B.C.] : City of Surrey, 2009.
HV 5822 M3 R476 2009
Social work with young people. 
Roger Smith.
Cambridge, UK : Polity, 2008.
HV 713 S594 2008
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I-4 pile-up. [videorecording].
Carrollton, Tex. : Critical Information Network, c2009.
1 videodisc (DVD) (30 min.): sd., col.; 4 3/4 in. + 1 
guide (9 p.). Title from container. "463-1009"--disc 
surface. Motor vehicle crashes in low-visibility 
conditions create a host of concerns for responders.  
Addresses planning prior to a disaster, safety concerns 
for responders working in near zero-visibility 
conditions, logistical needs of responders, and the 
value of multiagency exercises in preparing for large-
scale emergencies.
TH 9310.5 A443 2009 OCT D907
Risk analysis and security countermeasure 
selection.
Thomas L. Norman.
Boca Raton : CRC Press, c2010.
HV 8290 N67 2010
Risk assessment decisions for violent political 
extremism. 
D. Elaine Pressman.
[Ottawa, Ont.]: Public Safety Canada/ Securité 
publique Canada, 2009.
JC 328.6 P747 2009
Social work with young people. 
Roger Smith.
Cambridge, UK : Polity, 2008.
HV 713 S594 2008
Understanding criminal careers.
Keith Soothill, Claire Fitzpatrick and Brian Francis.
Cullompton : Willan, 2009.
HV 6080 S725 2009
Understanding youth offending: risk factor 
research, policy and practice.
Stephen Case and Kevin Haines.
Cullompton : Willan, 2009.
HV 9145 A5 C367 2009
Working with the enemy: how to survive and 
thrive with really difficult people.
Mike Leibling.
London ; Philadelphia : Kogan Page Limited, 2009.
BF 637 I48 L57 2009 
Evaluating crime reduction initiatives. 
edited by Johannes Knutsson and Nick Tilley.
Monsey, NY: Criminal Justice Press, 2009.
HV 7431 E93 2009 
Violence against women in South Asian 
communities: issues for policy and practice.
edited by Ravi K. Thiara and Aisha K. Gill ; foreword by 
Liz  Kelly.
London ; Philadelphia : Jessica Kingsley Publishers, 
2010.
HV 6250.4 W65 V567 2010
Verbal judo [videorecording]: two hour civilian 
overview
George J. Thompson.
Auburn, NY : Verbal Judo Institute, [1989].
1 videodisc (120 min.) : sd., col. ; 4 3/4 in. + tactical 
review card.
George Thompson teaches powerful communication 
skills that allow you to respond professionally to others, 
no matter what tensions may be present, and covers 
how to represent yourself and your ideas with greater 
persuasiveness and eloquence. This program is adapted 
for a civilian audience.
HM 132 T46 1989 D932
Color atlas of forensic medicine and pathology. 
[electronic resource] 
edited by Charles A. Catanese.
Boca Raton : CRC Press, c2010.
This electronic version of the text features cases from 
the New York City medical examiner's office, one of 
the busiest in the U.S. Because of the number of 
autopsies performed at this office, the range of 
examples is exhaustive. The topics covered include 
typical gunshot wounds, blunt and sharp force trauma, 
natural diseases with forensic ramifications, accidental 
deaths occurring in a therapeutic setting, and non-fatal
pathologies. This disc provides over 1200 color 
photographs that address both civil and criminally 
oriented cases.
RA 1063.4 C65 2010
Comparative policing: the struggle for 
democratization.
M. R. Haberfeld, Ibrahim Cerrah, editors.
Los Angeles: SAGE Publications, c2008.
HV 7921 C644 2008
Criminalistics: an introduction to forensic 
science.
Richard Saferstein.
Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Pearson Prentice Hall, 2010.
HV 8073 S24 2010
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Federal police law, 2010: annotated Royal 
Canadian Mounted Police Act and Regulations, 
1988 and other regulatory instruments.
Alain-Robert Nadeau.
Cowansville, Québec: Éditions Y. Blais, 2009.
KE 5008 N34 2010 (Shelved in Reference Section)
Gang investigator's handbook: a law-enforcement 
guide to identifying and combating violent street 
gangs.
[Matthew David O'Deane].
Boulder, Colo.: Paladin Press, c2008.
HV 8080 G35 O34 2008
Intelligent video surveillance: systems and 
technology.
edited by Yunqian Ma and Gang Qian.
Boca Raton: CRC Press, c2010.
HV 7936 T4 I58 2010
Introduction to private security: theory meets 
practice.
Cliff Roberson, Michael L. Birzer.
Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice Hall, c2010.
HV 8291 U6 R63 2010
The role of local police: striking a balance 
between immigration enforcement and civil 
liberties.
by Anita Khashu.
Washington, DC: Police Foundation, 2009.
HV 7936 C83 K44 2009
School violence: studies in alienation, revenge, 
and redemption.
Ingrid Rose.
London: Karnac Books, 2009.
LB 3013.3 R66 2009
Security manager's guide to disasters: managing 
through emergencies, violence, and other 
workplace threats.
Anthony D. Manley.
Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, c2009.
HD 49 M362 2009
Substance abuse in Canada.
Marilyn Herie, Wayne Skinner.
Don Mills, Ont. : OUP Canada, 2009.
HV 5000 C3 H47 2009 
Tactical perfection for street cops: survival tactics 
for field contacts, dangerous calls, and special 
arrests.
by Steve Albrecht.
Boulder, Colo.: Paladin Press, 2009.
HV 8080 P2 A385 2009
Understanding criminal investigation.
Stephen Tong, Robin P. Bryant, Miranda A.H. Horvath.
Chichester, UK; Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009.
HV 8073 T66 2009
Urbanization, policing, and security: global 
perspectives.
edited by Gary Cordner, AnnMarie Cordner, Dilip K. 
Das.
Boca Raton: CRC Press: International Police Executive 
Symposium, c2010.
HV 7243 U727 2010
Verbal judo [videorecording]: dramatizations.
Auburn, NY: Verbal Judo Institute, Inc., 2007.
1 videodisc (42 min.): sd., col.; 4 3/4 in. (DVD).
The sessions on this disc are divided into segments 
appropriate for use in Roll-Call sessions. Using 
dramatizations, Dr. George Thompson teaches law 
enforcement professionals how to use presence and 
words to deal effectively with, and generate voluntary 
compliance from "difficult people." The sessions 
produced with the Milwaukee Police Dept. include the
following  incidents: a tavern, a graveyard, child 
support, speeding, tourists and a beer drinker.
HM 132 V473 2007 D933
Dissolve [videorecording]: a documentary on drug 
facilitated sexual assault.
Vancouver, B.C. : Moving Images Distribution, c2009.
1 videodisc (42 min.) : sd., col. ; 4 3/4 in.
Title from container.
A little liquid or powder is slipped into a drink. Women 
are being  drugged into unconscious or semi-conscious 
states and being raped. They often have little or no 
memory of the attack or attacker -- just the feeling that
something horrible has happened. Due to the lack of 
awareness about these drugs, women are unaware of 
how vulnerable they are, and perpetrators are getting 
away with their crimes. Women need to know what 
they can do to protect themselves, heal, and potentially 
send their attackers to prison. Dissolve is a 
documentary on drug-facilitated sexual assault that will
inform, provoke and engage both men and women.
HV 6558 D57 2009 D905
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Canadian evidence law in a nutshell. 
by Ronald J. Delisle, Lisa Dufraimont
Toronto, Not: Carswell, 2009.
KE 8440 D445 2009
Challenges to fingerprints. 
Lyn Haber, Ralph Norman Haber.
Tucson, AZ: Lawyers & Judges Pub., c2009.
HV 6074 H33 2009
Crime scene photography. 
Edward M. Robinson; with a foreword by Gerald B. 
Richards.
Amsterdam; Boston: Academic Press/Elsevier, c2010.
TR 822 R63 2010
Critical issues in policing: contemporary 
readings. 
[edited by] Roger G. Dunham, Geoffrey P. Alpert.
Long Grove, Ill.: Waveland Press, c2010.
HV 8138 C6973 2010
Forensic dentistry. 
edited by David R. Senn, Paul G. Stimson.
Boca Raton: Taylor & Francis, 2010.
RA 1062 F67 2010
Identity theft handbook: detection, prevention, 
and security. 
Martin T. Biegelman.
Hoboken, N.J.: Wiley, c2009.
HV 6679 B54 2009
Law enforcement exam preparation study guide.  
[Joseph J Rios].
[S.l.]: Lulu, c2007.
HV 7923 R56 2007
Police corruption: deviance, accountability and 
reform in policing. 
Maurice Punch.
Devon; Portland, Ore.: Willan Publishing, c2009.
HV 7936 C85 P66 2009
Police officer's guide to K9 searches. 
Stephen A. Mackenzie.
Calgary: Detselig Enterprises, c2010.
HV 8025 M323 2010
The portable guide to evidence.
by Michael P. Doherty.
Toronto [Ont.]: Thomson Carswell, c2009.
KE 8440 D646 2009
Private security and the investigative process. 
Charles P. Nemeth.
Boca Raton [Fla.]: CRC Press/Taylor & Francis, c2010.
HV 8091 N46 2010
www.10-8.ca
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WARRANTLESS INVENTORY 
SEARCH OF VEHICLE 
REASONABLE
R. v. Strilec, 2010 BCCA 198
The accused was riding  a dirt bike 
motorcycle on a busy rural highway 
when he was stopped by a police 
officer concerned about several 
vehicle infractions. It was near dusk 
but the dirt bike displayed no headlights or taillights 
and the officer did not see it driving  until he came 
up beside it. Because the dirt bike was travelling  on 
the highway, it was required to be insured and 
equipped with illuminated headlights and taillights 
one-half hour after sunset.  The accused was asked 
for his driver’s licence, but replied that he did not 
have one. He said it was not his bike, it belonged to 
another person, and it was not insured. The officer 
told the accused that having  no insurance was an 
“arrestable offence” under the Motor Vehicle Act 
(MVA-s.79. But instead of arresting  the accused, he 
was going  to “detain” him for no insurance. The 
accused was patted down for weapons, handcuffed, 
and placed in the back of the police car (where the 
doors could not be opened from inside) until his 
name and driving  status could be confirmed. The 
officer said he did this because he had to check the 
VIN number, wasn’t sure whether the bike was 
stolen or not, and had drivers take off on him in the 
past. The pat down produced a small plastic bag, 
found in the accused’s pants pocket, which 
contained pil ls the accused identi f ied as 
“painkillers”. Computer checks revealed the accused 
did not have a driver’s licence, that the dirt bike was 
not insured, had not been registered, and had not 
been reported stolen. In addition, the officer learned 
the accused was a motor vehicle impound candidate 
under s.104.1 of the MVA, which meant the motor 
vehicle he drove could be impounded if he drove or 
operated a motor vehicle on a highway.
Before impounding  the motorcycle, the officer 
decided to retrieve whatever personal items were on 
the bike before the tow truck arrived.  There was a 
pouch attached to the handle bars.  Because he 
could not see how to detach the pouch, the officer 
simply removed the contents of the pouch to take to 
his car.  He had no suspicion that the pouch 
contained drugs and searched it “for inventory 
purposes,” intending  to return the contents of the 
pouch to the accused when he was released.  Plus, 
he didn’t want the accused to go back to the dirt 
bike because of the risk that he might leave. Upon 
opening  the zippered pouch, the officer saw two cell 
phones and a plastic bag  containing  lottery 
tickets. He knew lottery tickets were commonly used 
to wrap drugs, so he opened one and found a white 
substance he believed to be cocaine. It was 
subsequently determined that there were 43 “lotto 
paper flaps” which had a gross weight of 35.5 grams 
including  packaging. (One of the capsules from his 
pocket was also analyzed as morphine). The accused 
was then arrested for possessing  cocaine for the 
purpose of trafficking.  He said, “Trafficking? I was 
smoking.”  The accused was then advised of his right 
to counsel under s.10(b) of the Charter and said he 
wished to talk to a lawyer. From the time of the stop 
to when he was given his s.10(b) rights about 10 
minutes had elapsed. He was taken back to the 
police station where he said he didn’t need to speak 
to a lawyer because he was guilty. He was released 
on a promise to appear. 
The trial judge found that placing  the accused into 
the back of the police car while the officer made 
inquiries about the dirt bike was justified and the 
frisk search for safety reasons was not unreasonable; 
the road was narrow, busy with traffic, it was getting 
dark, and the accused’s identity was unconfirmed. 
As well, the trial judge held that the accused failed 
to establish that he had a sufficient privacy interest 
in the pouch attached to the motorbike to argue that 
its search violated s.8 of the Charter; the accused 
claimed that he was not the owner of the dirt bike 
and had not called evidence of his relationship with 
the alleged owner.  Even if the police breached s.8 
the trial judge would have nonetheless admitted the 
evidence. Finally, because the accused was initially 
told why he was being  detained and then given his s.
10(b) rights immediately after the the drugs were 
discovered and he was arrested, his Charter rights 
were provided as soon as practicable and the delay 
did not cause any prejudice to him. The accused was 
convicted of unlawfully possessing  cocaine for the 
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purpose of trafficking  and unlawfully possessing 
morphine.  
The accused appealed his conviction for possessing 
cocaine for the purpose of trafficking  to the British 
Columbia Court of Appeal arguing, in part, that his 
rights under ss.8  and 10(b) of the Charter were 
breached. In short, he suggested that his privacy was 
violated when the police officer examined the 
contents of the pouch. As well, he contended that he 
was denied his right to counsel. 
Search - s.8 
The accused argued that the police officer had no 
grounds to search the pouch, that its warrantless 
nature was unreasonable, and that the drugs found 
in the pouch should have been excluded under s.
24(2) of the Charter. However, the trial judge found 
that the accused had no reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the pouch and she did not feel it was 
necessary to determine whether the officer was 
entitled to empty the pouch for inventory purposes. 
The Court of Appeal, on the other hand, felt it was 
not necessary to discuss the privacy interest 
submissions because it concluded that the police 
had the authority to conduct an inventory search in 
these circumstances.
British Columbia’s MVA contains provisions (s. 
104.1-104.95) outlining  an administrative procedure 
for impounding  and returning  vehicles seized from 
an unlicensed driver.  This power authorized the 
impoundment of a vehicle for traffic safety reasons 
and allows the police to take possession of the 
vehicle and require that it be stored in a particular 
place. “[I]t is implicit in the legislation that the 
police have the duty and responsibility under the 
[MVA] to ensure the safety of the vehicle and its 
contents, and to do that they must be entitled to 
conduct an inventory of the vehicle’s contents,” said 
Justice Ryan delivering  the opinion of the Court. “In 
my view the authority to impound provided by s. 
104.1 of the [MVA] carries with it the duty and 
responsibility to take care of the vehicle and its 
contents, and to do that the police must be able to 
conduct an inventory of the vehicle’s contents.” 
Thus, the accused, even if having  a privacy interest 
in the pouch, was not subject to an unreasonable 
search. 
Right to Counsel - s.10(b)
Under s.73 of the MVA a police officer may require 
the driver of a motor vehicle to come to a stop and, 
when directed to do so, the driver is obliged to 
immediately come to a safe stop. Although no 
grounds are required to stop a vehicle under this 
provision, the stop must be related to traffic safety 
and regulation. Here, the accused was lawfully 
detained for the purpose of the MVA investigation; 
he was observed operating  a dirt bike not equipped 
with headlights or taillights. The accused agreed that 
the police had the right to stop him and to briefly 
detain him without advising  him of his s.10(b) rights 
while the police officer investigated other aspects of 
motor vehicle safety. He also did not challenge the 
decision of the police officer to take him to the 
police car and that it made sense to ask him to sit in 
it. However, the accused argued that the officer also 
handcuffed him and placed him in the back of the 
police car.  These actions, in the accused’s view, 
went beyond a brief roadside detention and became 
a de facto arrest, which required that he be informed 
of his right to contact counsel under s.10(b).
The Crown acknowledged that the duty to advise a 
person of their right to counsel arises on arrest or 
detention. However, it submitted that the officer was 
investigating  matters involving  highway safety and 
therefore was exempted, as a reasonable limit under 
s.1 of the Charter, from the requirement that s.10(b) 
rights be provided. In its view, the purpose of the 
stop and not the nature of the detention made it 
exempt from s.10(b).
The Court of Appeal agreed with the accused. 
Although the officer did not intend to arrest the 
“[T]he authority to impound provided by s. 
104.1 of the Motor Vehicle Act carries with it 
the duty and responsibility to take care of 
the vehicle and its contents, and to do that 
the police must be able to conduct an 
inventory of the vehicle’s contents.”  
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accused, his actions when viewed 
reasonably in the circumstances, met 
all the requirements of an arrest; he 
sat handcuffed in the police car. 
Here , I t was unnecessa ry to 
characterize the accused’s detention 
as a de facto arrest because the right 
to counsel also arises on detention 
and the purpose of the stop did not 
exempt the officer under s.1 of the 
Charter from advising  the accused of 
his s.10(b) rights. After reviewing 
other appellate cases, Justice Ryan 
stated:
What can be gathered from these 
cases is that it is not simply the 
purpose of the safety traffic stop that 
justifies a failure to provide the 
driver with his or her right to 
counsel.  It is justified by the fact 
that the stop is brief, minimally 
intrusive and limited to what is 
reasonably necessary to achieve the purpose of 
the stop.
It follows that when [the accused] was restrained 
by handcuffs and placed in the back of the 
locked police car he was not subject to the type 
of minimally intrusive detention that would have 
permitted [the officer]l to deal with him without 
providing him with his right to counsel.  To the 
contrary, the detention was significant, coercive 
and incompatible with the type of stop 
anticipated by the decisions in Ladouceur and 
Orbanski.  [The accused] was in a vulnerable 
position having  been  taken into the effective 
control of [the officer].
  .........
Section 10(b) of the Charter was designed to 
protect persons in [the accused’s] position.
In conclusion I am of the view that the [accused] 
is correct in asserting that the type of detention 
he experienced in the case at bar triggered his 
rights guaranteed by s.10(b) of the Charter.  
[paras. 40-44]
The nature of the accused’s detention required the 
police to advise him of the right to counsel and in 
failing to do so breached s.10(b). 
s.24(2) Exclusion
Since the police breached his s.10(b) 
Charter rights, the Court of Appeal had to 
determine whether his statements made 
to police should be excluded. In deciding 
whether evidence should be excluded 
under s.24(2), a court must assess and 
balance the effect of admitting  the 
evidence on society’s confidence in the 
justice system having regard to: 
(1) the seriousness of the Charter-
infringing  state conduct (admission 
may send the message the justice 
system condones serious state 
misconduct); 
(2) the impact of the breach on the 
Charter-protected interests of the 
accused (admission may send the 
message that individual rights count 
for little); and 
(3) society’s interest in the adjudication 
of the case on its merits. 
The court’s role on a s.24(2) application is to 
balance the assessments under each of these lines of 
inquiry to determine whether, considering  all the 
circumstances, admission of the evidence would 
bring the administration of justice into disrepute.
Seriousness of the Charter-infringing Conduct 
The Court of Appeal found the seriousness of the 
Charter-infringing  state conduct fell toward the 
middle or higher end of the spectrum of seriousness:
• although not willful or reckless, it was not 
inadvertent or minor;
• it did not result from a good faith mistake; the 
police officer had a negligent understanding  of 
his authority and duties;
• the detention exceeded what was necessary and 
reasonable;
“[I]t is not simply the 
purpose of the 
safety traffic stop 
that justifies a failure 
to provide the driver 
with his or her right 
to counsel. It is 
justified by the fact 
that the stop is brief, 
minimally intrusive 
and limited to what is 
reasonably 
necessary to achieve 
the purpose of the 
stop.”  
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• although the officer feared the accused would 
leave the scene, he gave no reason for the 
concern except that he had such an experience 
with others;
• for the purpose of roadside detention the 
handcuffing was excessive and without authority;
• the Supreme Court judgment R. v. Orbanski was 
decided in 2005 and ought to have been known 
to him;
• the officer determined he could have arrested the 
accused under s.79 MVA which would have 
required s.10(b), but chose to detain him under s.
73 MVA which would not.
Impact on Charter-protected Interests 
The impact of the breach on the Charter-protected 
interests of the accused was not minor nor fleeting.  
“[The accused] was only advised that he was being 
arrested for possession of cocaine after he had been 
patted down, handcuffed, and placed in the back of 
the police car,” said Justice Ryan. “He was in a 
vulnerable position and made statements about the 
drugs before he was advised of his s.10(b) rights.  
The breach was a serious incursion on [the 
accused’s] Charter interests.”
Society’s Interest in Adjudication on the Merits
The offence of possessing  cocaine for the purpose of 
trafficking  was serious and the public had an interest 
in truth-finding  and in adjudicating  serious crimes 
on their merits. However, there is a special concern 
that police conduct themselves properly in obtaining 
statements from suspects because of issues of 
reliability.  Here, the accused’s first statement was 
made immediately after being  told that drugs had 
been discovered in the pouch on the dirt bike. His 
second statement was made after he had been 
advised of his rights and after he arrived at the police 
station.  Thus, in these circumstances the concern 
about the reliability of both statements might appear 
to have been reduced. However, Justice Ryan found 
the first statement was elicited after the accused had 
been unlawfully placed in a vulnerable position 
while the officer carried on his inquiries.  “It was 
while he was being  held in this way that the 
[accused] was told that drugs had been found in the 
pouch on the dirt bike and that the statement was 
made,” said Justice Ryan. “Thus the fact that he had 
been physically restrained for a period of time before 
making  the statement detracts from its spontaneity 
and reliability.”  And as for the second statement it 
was tainted by the circumstances of the taking  of the 
first; it was causally and contextually linked.  “In 
other words, having  made the first statement at the 
scene, and without being  told that the first statement 
would have no impact on a second, there would be 
no point in [the accused’s] mind that he talk to a 
lawyer, the damage was already done.”
The statements were excluded and, without them, 
there was little evidence to connect the accused to 
the drugs found in the handlebar pouch.  Absent 
such proof, the accused’s appeal was allowed, his 
conviction was set aside, and an acquittal was 
entered. 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
BY THE BOOK:
 s.79(b) BC’s Motor Vehicle Act
An officer or constable of 
t h e R oya l C a n a d i a n 
Mounted Police or of the 
police department of a 
municipality may arrest 
without warrant … (b)  
a person driving a 
motor vehicle who the 
officer or constable has 
reasonable and probable 
grounds to believe is not insured as required by 
this Act or does not hold a valid and subsisting 
motor vehicle liability insurance card or 
financial responsibility card, ... and may detain 
the person arrested until he or she can be 
brought before a justice to be dealt with 
according to law. 
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ANONYMOUS TIP PLUS 
CORROBORATION AMOUNTS TO 
REASONABLE GROUNDS
R. v. Safi, 2010 ABCA 151 
Police received an anonymous 
Crimestoppers tip that later in the day 
a 21-year-old individual named Safi 
would be arriving  in Edmonton from 
British Columbia on a Greyhound 
bus carrying  cocaine on his person as well as a 
handgun. Police checked out the name and found a 
date of birth, a residential address in British 
Columbia, involvement in a weapons complaint that 
year, and that Safi’s recognizance did not allow him 
to be out of Alberta. They also obtained a photo. The 
Greyhound Bus company was contacted and police 
learned there was a bus soon arriving  in Edmonton 
from Vancouver. But police were unable to confirm 
whether Safi was a passenger because Greyhound 
did not have a manifest. Members of the drug  and 
tactical unit attended at the bus station to arrest or 
detain the accused for possession of drugs and 
weapons if he disembarked. He did arrive on the bus 
at the time suggested and when he disembarked he 
was immediately stopped by police, arrested, and 
searched. He was in possession of about 250 grams 
of cocaine, a handgun, and ammunition. 
At trial in the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench on 
several charges including  possessing cocaine for the 
purpose of trafficking, possessing  proceeds of crime, 
and carrying  a concealed handgun, the accused 
argued that his detention, arrest, and search 
breached the Charter. The trial judge, however, 
found that the police had sufficient information from 
the tip and their subsequent investigation to form 
reasonable grounds to arrest the accused and search 
him as an incident to that arrest. Not only did the 
o f f i c e r h a v e t h e 
necessary subjective 
grounds for arrest, it 
was also objectively 
reasonable; the tip was 
detailed, compelling 
and reliable based on 
i t s c o n t e n t a n d 
subsequent corroboration. As well, the trial judge 
held that the accused appeared to be breaching  his 
recognizance which on its own would have 
provided grounds for arrest.
The accused then appealed to the Alberta Court of 
Appeal submitting  his rights under ss.8  and 9 had 
been breached and that the evidence should have 
been excluded under s.24(2). In his view, the tip was 
unreliable and insufficiently corroborated to justify 
an arrest; the arrest and search were therefore 
unlawful. He suggested that the details of the 
anonymous tip (which lacked detail and was 
indistinguishable from mere rumour or gossip), 
along  with the police investigation that followed, 
was insufficient to satisfy the reasonable belief 
standard; both the details of the tip and the 
information subsequently obtained by police were 
innocuous and there was no information about the 
tipster, their reliability, or past performance. The 
Crown, on the other hand, contended that there 
were no Charter breaches because the police had 
reasonable grounds to either arrest or detain the 
accused based on the tip and subsequent police 
corroboration. Furthermore, the accused was 
breaching  his recognizance which would have 
independently justified the arrest. Thus, searching 
the accused was either justified as incidental to 
arrest or as an incident to detention for officer safety 
reasons. 
The Alberta Court of Appeal agreed with the Crown. 
Here, “the police did not act on the basis of an 
uncorroborated tip,” said Justice Paperny. “They did 
further investigation.” The trial judge did not make a 
mistake in finding  reasonable grounds for the arrest. 
Although the tip was anonymous, it was specific 
enough that it outlined a date of arrival, a name, 
age, mode of transportation, and where the accused 
was coming  from. There were also sufficient details 
of the alleged offence. As well, the tip was 
compelling  because the police investigation 
matched the name and age of an individual, and 
there was a potential breach of a recognizance. 
Furthermore, the police investigation linked the 
accused to some previous criminal activity; a 
weapons offence. The fact the accused disembarked 
from the bus was also corroborative. 
“The police did not act 
on the basis of an 
uncorroborated tip. 
Here they did further 
investigation.”  
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Even if the police could not arrest the accused for 
the drugs and gun, they could have arrested him for 
breach of the recognizance. Plus, a detention was 
entirely justified in the circumstances and a pat-
down search was authorized for officer safety 
reasons. The accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca
REASONABLE GROUNDS MORE 
THAN MERE SUSPICION, BUT 
LESS THAN BALANCE OF 
PROBABILITIES
R. v. Nguyen, 2010 ABCA 146 
The accused became the subject of 
an investigation after police received 
a confidential tip that two individuals 
were trafficking  drugs. The informant 
l inked these individuals to a 
particular address. They did not live 
there but it was believed that illicit drug  activity was 
taking  place. Surveillance of the address revealed 
the presence of a red Corvette, linked to the 
accused. He had also been seen at the address. A 
police informant subsequently 
provided information that the 
accused was the head of a criminal 
network supplying  cocaine; he 
would bring  drugs from Vancouver, 
drove a red Corvette, lived near a 
Blockbuster video store, and 
operated out of JOX Sports Bar. 
Police reports on the accused 
included information that he had 
previously provided six ounces of 
cocaine to an undercover officer 
and had been charged with selling 
58  pounds of marijuana. However, 
no convictions resulted from either 
incident. An intelligence log  also 
revealed that someone had 
appeared at a police station stating 
that he was scared that his brother, 
a high-level drug  trafficker having 
the same name as the accused, 
would harm him. But no action 
was taken on this file. Furthermore, additional 
information was received by the drug  unit from an 
unknown source that a red Corvette had been seen 
at a known drug  location and that someone with the 
accused’s first name was selling  high amounts of 
cocaine in downtown Edmonton. 
Following  a motor vehicle search confirming  that the 
red Corvette was registered to the accused, 
surveillance was set up. Police saw the accused 
drive to a mall, circle the lot, and then stop beside 
another vehicle and have a discussion with two 
women. Two of the people were using  cell phones. 
One of the women was known to be involved in 
mid-level drug  trafficking. It was believed this was a 
negotiation between dealers. The accused then went 
into a condominium complex carrying  a black 
portfolio. Four days later he was seen driving  to the 
JOX Sports Bar where a male entered his vehicle and 
then left about a minute later. The accused went 
back to the condominium complex. An hour and a 
half later he left that location with a black bag. 
The next day the accused’s vehicle was seen parked 
at the condominium complex. He left one of the 
units with an orange and white cell phone box, 
drove to JOX Sports Bar, remained in his vehicle for 
about 20 minutes and then 
drove away. It was believed 
he used his cell phone. The 
investigator directed a marked 
police vehicle to conduct a 
“traffic stop,” which was done 
in the accused’s driveway. The 
investigator then approached 
the accused , iden t i f i ed 
himself, and commented 
about suspicious activity he 
had observed at the JOX 
Sports Bar. When asked if 
there was any contraband, 
weapons, or alcohol in the 
vehicle, the accused said no. 
The officer opened the orange 
and white cell phone box in 
the car, found cocaine and 
arrested the accused. A search 
of the car was done and more 
cocaine, as well as money, 
“The legal threshold to establish 
reasonable grounds to arrest 
does not require a prima facie 
case but rather that the grounds 
for arrest in all the circumstances 
are reasonable. The question is 
whether a reasonable person 
standing in the position of the 
officer could conclude that 
based on all the factors known or 
observed there were reasonable 
grounds to arrest. This means 
something more than mere 
suspicion, but less than proof on 
the balance of probabilities.”  
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three cell phones, and a key to a condominium 
complex, was found. 
At trial in the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench the 
accused alleged his rights under ss.8 and 9 of the 
Charter, among  others, had been breached. 
Following  a voir dire the trial judge concluded the 
police did not breach these rights. He found that 
when the arresting  officer ordered the vehicle stop 
he had reasonable grounds to arrest the accused for 
possession of illegal drugs. The accused was 
convicted on several counts of possessing  drugs for 
the purpose of trafficking, possessing  proceeds of 
crime, and possessing illegal handguns. 
The accused then challenged his conviction before 
the Alberta Court of Appeal, suggesting  his arrest 
was illegal. Although he accepted that the arresting 
officer subjectively had grounds to arrest for drug 
possession, he submitted that the trial judge erred in 
the objective assessment of these grounds. The Court 
of Appeal disagreed. 
Under s.495(1) of the Criminal Code, a peace officer 
has the power to arrest without a warrant. This 
requires “that an arresting  officer 
subjectively have grounds on 
which to base the arrest, which 
must be justifiable from an 
objective point of view,” said the 
Court. “In other words, the court 
is required to evaluate, in 
addition to the officer’s own 
belief, whether such a belief was 
objectively reasonable. The court 
must determine whether in all 
the circumstances at the time of 
the arrest, viewed objectively, 
did reasonable grounds exist.” 
The Court continued:
 
The legal threshold to establish reasonable 
grounds to arrest does not require a prima facie 
case but rather that the grounds for arrest in all 
the circumstances are reasonable. The question 
is whether a reasonable person standing in the 
position of the officer could conclude that based 
on all the factors known or observed there were 
reasonable grounds to arrest. This means 
something more than mere suspicion, but less 
than proof on the balance of probabilities. 
Moreover, the standard must be interpreted 
contextually, having  regard to the circumstances 
in their entirety, including the timing involved, 
the events leading  up to the arrest both 
immediate and  over time, and the dynamics at 
play in the arrest. In evaluating  whether 
objectively reasonable grounds exist, the 
evidence must be viewed cumulatively. 
[references omitted, para. 18]
Here, the trial judge considered the facts, the 
information gleaned from police records, informants, 
and surveillance in concluding  the officer had 
reasonable grounds to arrest. The subjective test was 
satisfied and, as for the objective portion of the test, 
the trial judge found that a reasonable person 
standing  in the shoes of the arresting  officer would 
have reasonably believed that the accused was 
probably in possession of drugs, taking  into account 
the constellation of facts and information known to 
him, his own observations, and his extensive 
experience as an officer investigating  the drug  trade. 
Even though another judge may have reached a 
different conclusion, the trial judge’s decision was 
supported by the evidence:
Given the confidential source 
information that [the accused] was 
involved at a high level in the drug 
trade, where and how he conducted 
his business, police intelligence on 
[the accused] that he had been found 
in possession of drugs on more than 
one occasion, although not convicted, 
his involvement with other alleged 
associates and their connection to 
drug trafficking, and the surveillance 
conducted by police generally and 
[the arresting  officer] specifically 
which confirmed some of the information, for 
example,a place and pattern of operating, we 
cannot say that the conclusion of the trial judge 
was unreasonable. [para. 20]
Therefore, the officer had reasonable grounds to 
arrest prior to the search of the cell phone box. The 
accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca 
“[Section 495(1) of the 
Criminal Code] requires 
that an arresting officer 
subjectively have grounds 
on which to base the 
arrest,
which must be justifiable 
from an objective point of 
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RETROSPECTIVE APPLICATION 
OF SOIRA DID NOT BREACH 
s.7 CHARTER
R. v. Warren, 2010 ABCA 133
The accused plead guilty to four 
counts of sexual assault. He was 
sentenced to a 12 month conditional 
sentence, placed on probation for 
two years, and ordered to provide a 
DNA sample. About 10 months later the Sex 
Offender Information Registration Act (SOIRA) was 
proclaimed and, a couple of years later, the accused 
was served with a notice to comply with the Act. He 
then applied for a court declaration that the 
retrospective application of ss.490.019 and 
490.02(1) of the Criminal Code, relating  to his 
obligation to comply with SOIRA breached s.7 of 
the Charter. An Alberta provincial Court judge 
concluded that a SOIRA order was not punishment. 
It therefore involved only a minimal interference 
with an offender’s liberty and did not violate s.7. An 
appeal to the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench was 
dismissed. The accused then appealed to the Alberta 
Court of Appeal. 
A majority of the Court of Appeal found that the 
established principle of criminal law that there can 
be no crime or punishment unless it is in 
accordance with a law that is certain, unambiguous, 
and not retroactive was not offended. The 
registration of an offender under SOIRA does not 
cons t i tu te punishment and there fore the 
retrospective application of SOIRA did not impose a 
sanction that offended the principle against the 
retroactive application of the criminal law. Nor did it 
impose a process after an offender had been 
sentenced which offended the principles of natural 
justice. “There is no principle of fundamental justice 
to the effect that a statute cannot apply retroactively 
or retrospectively where the law does not constitute 
a punishment,” said the majority. “While registration 
in accordance with the SOIRA may infringe an 
offender’s liberty interest, the offender is not 
deprived of that liberty interest in a manner that 
contravenes the principles of fundamental justice.” 
Thus, ss.490.019 and 490.02(1) did not breach s.7 
despite their retrospective application.
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca
BY THE BOOK:
 Sex Offender Information Registration Act
The Sex Offender Information Registration Act 
(SOIRA) came into force in 2004, amending the 
Criminal Code. Sections 490.011 through 
490.032 of the Criminal Code empower a court, 
on application by a prosecutor, to order those 
persons convicted of “designated offences” to 
provide information to the Sexual Offences 
Registry. The purpose of the SOIRA is “to help 
police services investigate crimes of a sexual nature by requiring 
the registration of certain information relating to sex offenders”.
Section 490.012(4) requires the court to balance the intended 
purpose of the Registry with the offender’s privacy and liberty 
interests.  A SOIRA order can be denied if a court “is satisfied that 
the person has established that, if the order were made, the impact 
on them, including on their privacy or liberty, would be grossly 
disproportionate to the public interest in protecting society through 
the effective investigation of crimes of a sexual nature, to be 
achieved by the registration of information relating to sex offenders 
under the Sexual Offender Information Registration Act.”
The reporting obligations under SOIRA require both initial and 
annual reporting to a registration centre. In addition, an offender 
must, within 15 days, report any change of address, change of 
name or absence from his primary or secondary residence.
Persons collecting SOIRA information also have responsibilities. 
The person must ensure that the sex offender’s privacy is respected 
in “a manner that is reasonable in the circumstances” and that the 
information is provided and collected in a way that protects its 
confidentiality.  The information must be registered in the database 
in a way that protects its confidentiality. There are strict 
prohibitions on data usage set and, essentially, the information is 
available only to police to investigate sexual offences. Public 
dissemination is not permitted.Depending on the nature of the 
index offence, the order ends 10 or 20 years after it was made, or 
applies for life. If the offence is a summary conviction offence or 
was punishable by two to five years’ imprisonment, the order will 
expire after 10 years. For an offence with a maximum term of 10 or 
14 years’ imprisonment, the order ends after 20 years. A lifetime 
order is made if the maximum penalty is a life sentence.
An offender who fails to comply with a SOIRA order, without a 
reasonable excuse, is guilty of a criminal offence and is liable to a 
fine of $10,000 or six months’ imprisonment, or both, in the case 
of a first offence. For subsequent offences, the fine is the same, but 
the maximum term of imprisonment is two years. - Source R. v. 
Warren, 2010 ABCA 133
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SOIRA ORDER IS NOT 
PUNISHMENT
R. v. C.L.B., 2010 ABCA 134
The accused was convicted of 
touching  for a sexual purpose. More 
than two years later SOIRA was 
proclaimed into law and then 10 
months later the accused was served 
with a notice to comply with the legislation. He then 
app l ied fo r a dec la ra t ion rega rd ing  the 
constitutionality of the SOIRA provisions. He argued 
that s.490.019 of the Criminal Code violated ss.11(h) 
and (i) of the Charter. The Alberta Court of Queen’s 
Bench judge ruled that SOIRA and related Criminal 
Code provisions do not impose a punishment, and 
therefore do not infringe ss.11(h) or (i).
 
Section 11(h) of the Charter
Section 11(i) of the Charter
A majority of the Court of Appeal noted that ss.11(h) 
and (i) “apply only where the real object of the 
legislation is to punish or where legislation imposes 
a true penal consequence.” However, the 
registration of an offender under the SOIRA does not 
constitute punishment. Thus, ss.490.19 and 
490.02(1) of the Criminal Code do not violate either 
subsections 11(h) or 11(i) of the Charter. The 
accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca
REASONABLE SUSPICION FOR 
DETENTION & DOG SNIFF 
ANALYTICALLY DISTINCT
R. v. Schrenk, 2010 MBCA 38                
 
Two police officers were on general 
p a t r o l i n a m a r k e d p o l i c e 
vehicle.  They had a dog  specially 
trained to to detect drugs in the back 
of the vehicle. After observing  a car 
with Alberta rental plates, they decided to stop it to 
determine whether the driver had a valid licence, 
the vehicle was properly registered, and the rental 
documents were in order. An officer approached the 
passenger side of the vehicle and asked the accused 
for his driver’s licence and insurance for the 
vehicle. During  this three to four minute interaction 
the officer made a number of observations which 
caused him some concern:
• the accused had a British Columbia driver’s 
licence; 
• the contract for the car revealed that it had been 
rented approximately 24 hours earlier in 
Calgary and was required to be delivered to the 
Montreal airport less than 24 hours later;
LEGALLY SPEAKING:
Retroactive v. Retrospective
Retroact ive - w h e n n e w 
legislation addresses and modifies 
the legal consequences of facts 
which occurred prior to the 
commencement of the legislation. 
Retrospective - when new legislation modifies only 
the future effects of past facts, while leaving 
unchanged the consequences of the facts which 
occurred prior to commencement of the legislation.
Source: R. v. Warren, 2010 ABCA 133 at footnote 1. 
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Any person charged with an offence has the 
right ...  (h) if finally acquitted of the offence, not 
to be tried for it again and, if finally found guilty 
and punished for the offence, not to be tried or 
punished for it again.
Any person charged with an offence has the 
right ... (i) if found guilty of the offence and if the 
punishment for the offence has been varied 
between the time of commission and the time of 
sentencing, to the benefit of the lesser 
punishment.
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• the accused said he was still 
living  in British Columbia, but 
explained that he had flown to 
Calgary from Vancouver and 
rented the car to drive to 
Toronto for a little holiday to 
visit relatives;
• when asked why he would fly 
from Vancouver to Calgary, but 
then drive to Toronto, the 
accused explained he could 
not afford the flight from 
Vancouver to Toronto and his 
family was going  to pay for him 
to get back to Vancouver.  The 
rental agreement set out the total cost of the 
one‑way car rental to be $235.90 per day or 
$1,140 per week before taxes, which was 
considerably more than a one-way flight from 
Vancouver to Toronto. 
Inside the car the officer noticed various food 
wrappers, an open box of bottled water, some other 
drinks, two cell phones on the console and a large 
suitcase in the back seat. The officer became 
suspicious that the accused was lying  to him; his trip 
was nonsensical. The cost of renting  the car was 
much higher than the cost of airfare. He also 
wondered why a suitcase would be in the back seat 
of a vehicle with a large trunk. The timing  of the trip 
suggested that the accused was travelling  very 
quickly and could not have stopped, except very 
briefly.  The officer knew from his training  and 
experience that this was a practice used by persons 
transporting  contraband. But a computer check 
revealed nothing.   The officer discussed the situation 
and his observations with his partner, who then 
attended to the passenger’s side of the car, observed 
the items inside, and spoke to the accused.  He 
confirmed the accused’s travel plans and then 
returned the driver’s licence and rental agreement to 
the accused.  The officer noticed that the accused’s 
hands were shaking  violently when he handed the 
papers back to him to such an extent that he was 
unable to put his driver’s licence back in his wallet.  
At that point, eight minutes had passed from the 
time the accused was first stopped.
The officer told the accused, 
“You’re free to leave, Mr. 
Schrenk, have a safe trip.”  
T h e a c c u s e d r e p l i e d , 
“Thanks,” as he was trying  to 
get his driver’s licence back in 
his wallet.  When he could 
not do so, he put the licence 
on the console.  The officer 
then waited eight to ten 
seconds and asked the 
accused, “Mr. Schrenk, could 
I a sk you a coup le o f 
questions?   You don’t have to 
answer if you don’t want 
to.”  The accused replied, 
“Yeah, sure,” but did not make eye contact. The 
accused was asked whether there was a big  drug 
problem in British Columbia, and he answered, “I 
wouldn’t know anything  about that.”  He looked 
away and sat on his hands while answering  the 
question.
The officer then believed that he had reasonable 
grounds to detain the accused for a drug 
investigation based on the totality of the 
circumstances. His answers and mannerisms 
reinforced the officer’s suspicions that the accused 
was involved in illegal activity and that based upon 
the totality of the indicators he believed that he was 
not being  truthful and was involved in transporting 
drugs. The accused was asked to leave the car and 
was detained for a drug  investigation.  He was 
explained his right to contact a lawyer, to which he 
answered, “No, I don’t think so.”  He was then 
advised of his right to silence. The accused did not 
consent to a search. He was placed in a police car, 
without handcuffs, and the sniffer dog  was deployed 
around the car. The dog  was trained to recognize the 
smell of several different illegal drugs, including 
marihuana. When the dog  came to the area near the 
trunk, she sat down, a signal that drugs were 
detected.  The accused was arrested, advised of his 
right to counsel and read the standard police 
caution. A search of the inside of the trunk revealed 
three bags, each containing  marihuana in vacuum-
sealed packages weighing  about 81.6 pounds and 
valued between $89,100 and $121,500. The elapsed 
“Eighteen minutes of interaction 
between police and a motorist 
on a cold winter’s day has kept 
the hearth of the justice system 
burning for over five years. This 
appeal is another case about 
finding the balance between 
individual liberty and society’s 
interest in the effective 
investigation of crime.”  
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time from the stop  until the arrest was about 18 
minutes.
At trial in Manitoba Provincial Court the accused 
was convicted of possessing  marihuana for the 
purpose of trafficking. The trial judge found that the 
accused had not been arbitrarily detained when he 
was stopped pursuant to the provisions of 
Manitoba’s Highway Traffic Act (HTA). The officers’ 
questions were objectively linked to issues relevant 
to HTA concerns.  Neither his s.10(b) Charter  rights 
nor his right to silence under s.7 were violated 
during  this time. And when the officer asked him a 
question  after he was told that he was free to go he 
was not psychologically detained. The trial judge 
also ruled that the officer had reasonable grounds to 
detain the accused for investigative purposes. 
Finally, in the totality of the circumstances, the dog 
sniff was not a Charter breach because it was not a 
search within the meaning  of s.8, nor was there 
anything  inherently unreasonable in the police 
action. The accused was given a conditional 
sentence of two years less one day and fined 
$10,000.
The accused appealed to the Manitoba Court of 
Appeal. He submitted that although the initial stop 
may have been lawful, the officers’ questions went 
beyond legitimate highway safety concerns and 
turned into a drug  investigation.  At that point, he 
submitted that he was unlawfully detained and was 
not given his right to counsel. Despite being  told he 
was free to go and did not have to answer any 
questions, the accused felt that he had no choice 
and was therefore psychologically detained at that 
point as well. The accused’s answer to the question 
about a drug  problem in British Columbia did not 
give rise to reasonable grounds to detain. While the 
officer may have had a subjective belief that he had 
a reasonable suspicion, the reasonable grounds must 
be both subjectively and objectively reasonable. 
Lastly, the accused contended that the dog  sniff was 
a breach of his right to be free from unreasonable 
search contrary to s. 8 of the Charter.
The Crown, on the other hand, suggested the 
accused’s initial detention for the traffic stop was 
lawful, and the routine roadside questioning  did not 
trigger the right to counsel or the right to silence. The 
routine traffic stop then ended and police pursued 
their suspicions of crime. Because the accused was 
not detained, any discussion with police did not 
trigger the right to counsel or the right to silence. 
Once the police decided that they had a reasonable 
suspicion, they lawfully detained the accused for a 
drug  investigation which also authorized the use of 
the sniffer dog  to sniff the outside of the accused’s 
car without becoming  an unreasonable search. The 
totality of circumstances, including  the drug  dog 
indication, provided reasonable grounds to arrest the 
accused and lawful authority to search his car for 
evidence incidental to the arrest.
PHASE 1: Routine Stop
Section 76.1 of the HTA allowed a peace officer, in 
the lawful execution of his or her duties and 
responsibilities, to require the driver of a motor 
vehicle to stop. The driver of the motor vehicle, 
when signalled or requested to stop by a peace 
officer who was readily identifiable as such, was 
then required to immediately come to a safe stop 
and remain stopped until permitted by the peace 
officer to depart. Justice Steel, authoring  the 
unanimous Court of Appeal judgment, had this to 
say:
It is well accepted that random traffic stops 
pursuant to highway traffic legislation are a 
violation of s. 9 of the Charter, but ultimately 
reasonably and demonstrably justified under s. 1 
so long as they are limited in time and scope to 
the purpose for which they are permitted. 
So, the questions that may justifiably be asked 
on such a traffic stop are those related to driving 
and highway safety.   Any further, more intrusive 
procedures can only be undertaken upon 
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.  The 
court must be alert to the danger of allowing 
these traffic stops to be turned into a means of 
conducting  either an unfounded general 
inquisition or an unreasonable search.  [paras. 
34-35]
Appropriate routine police interaction with a 
motorist during  traffic stops will typically be short in 
duration, require the production of only a few 
documents, and will be of minimal inconvenience 
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to the motorist.  They will not constitute a danger to 
the safety of the motorist, seldom be reason to leave 
the roadside and attend to a police station, and 
usually there will be no need to intrusively search 
the driver or the vehicle.  
Here, the traffic stop was in a public place in the 
middle of the day, with no coercive measures taken 
by the police.  The three to four minutes of polite 
questioning  was about the vehicle and the accused’s 
operation of it. The police questions related to driver 
licencing, vehicle registration, and permission to 
have care and control of the vehicle were lawful 
since they related to the purpose of the stop.   The 
questions regarding  the nature of the accused’s 
journey did not exceed the permissible parameters 
of traffic stop questioning.  “It is reasonable for such 
questioning  to include particulars of a trip, such as 
destination, route and purpose,” said Justice Steel. 
“Given that the rental car was from Alberta and the 
accused indicated his residency was in British 
Columbia, it was reasonable for the officer to 
establish the residency of the driver to ensure proper 
licencing, an area rationally connected to road 
safety.   The answers he received legitimately raised 
his suspicions, leading  to other questions. ... [The 
officer] was entitled to reasonably ascertain what he 
was dealing  with given the accused’s strange 
answers and the discrepancy between his driver’s 
licence and the rental agreement.”  Justice Steel 
continued:
In addition, I do not see any concerns raised by 
the visual observations made by the officers 
during  the traffic stop of items which were in 
plain view, such as the large suitcase and the 
lived-in appearance of the vehicle.    No Charter 
concern arises merely from police investigating 
criminal activity revealed by the traffic stop so 
long as the limits of police powers for road-
safety purposes are respected.  
Information gained by police from such roadside 
questioning can be used as an investigative tool 
by police to confirm or reject an officer’s 
suspicions so long as the questioning itself 
related to the vehicle or its operation and was 
not a general inquisition asking questions such 
as whether, for example, the accused took drugs 
or had any criminal convictions.  
There is no sound reason for invalidating an 
otherwise proper stop because the police used 
the opportunity afforded by that stop to further 
some other legitimate interest.   The police can 
use a legitimate traffic stop to avail themselves of 
the opportunity to further some other legitimate 
police interest, and the gathering of police 
intelligence is well within the ongoing police 
duty to investigate criminal activity.  [reference 
omitted, paras. 42-44]
Because the police may be also investigating  a 
possible crime does not takes the officers’ actions 
outside the ambit of a routine stop. “The fact that the 
questioning  may have a secondary purpose does not 
make the highway stop unlawful so long  as the 
questioning  is restricted appropriately,” said Justice 
Steel. “A stop to check a driver’s licence is lawful 
even if there was a secondary purpose of drug 
investigation.”  As for s.10(b), “police are not 
required to give s.10(b) Charter warnings during  a 
brief roadside stop made for road-safety purposes, 
again so long  as the questioning  is related to the 
vehicle or its operation.  The exercise of the rights 
guaranteed by s.10(b) is incompatible with the brief 
roadside detention contemplated by such a stop.” 
The Court of Appeal found that from the time the 
accused was pulled over until the time his 
documents were returned to him and he was told he 
was free to go, he was detained under the HTA but 
any breach of s.9 was saved by s.1.
 
PHASE 2: Further Questioning
After telling  the accused that he was free to go,  the 
officer waited eight to 10 seconds and then asked 
the accused if he could ask a few questions. The 
Court of Appeal found this was simple questioning 
between the police and a citizen and that the 
accused was not being  psychologically detained in 
breach of s.9: 
Detention under s. 9 of the Charter refers to a 
suspension of the individual’s liberty interest by 
a significant physical or psychological restraint.  
A detention must exist before the right to 
counsel or the right to silence is triggered.  
While it is usually clear whether someone is 
being physically restrained, the same cannot 
always be said about psychological detention.
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When considering interactions between police 
and citizens, it is important to differentiate 
between questioning and detention.  Not all 
communications between police and citizens 
will reach the threshold of psychological 
detention, even when a person is under 
investigation for criminal activity, is asked 
questions or is physically delayed by contact 
with the police.  There is no presumption of 
detention based merely on questioning 
occurring between police and a citizen. [paras. 
51-52]
Psychological detention occurs “either where the 
individual has a legal obligation to comply with the 
restrictive request or demand, or a reasonable 
person would conclude by reason of the state 
conduct that he or she had no choice but to 
comply”:
This definition of psychological detention gives 
the police leeway to engage members of the 
public in non-coercive, exploratory questioning 
without necessarily triggering  their Charter rights 
relating to detention.  It does not require that 
police abstain from interacting with members of 
the public until they have specific grounds to 
connect the individual to the commission of a 
crime.  Rather, whether a reasonable person 
concluded that they no longer had the freedom 
to choose whether or not to cooperate with the 
police becomes an objective determination, 
made in light of the circumstances of an 
encounter as a whole.  In cases such as the one 
at bar, where there is no physical restraint or 
legal obligation, a detainee-centred, objective 
inquiry must be undertaken as to whether there 
was psychological detention.
Here, while the accused was being  singled out 
because he had been stopped, there were no 
demands or directions made. The officer asked 
permission of the accused before asking  him a 
question.  The officer’s tone and voice were non-
threatening  and the accused would have been 
released if he did not cooperate.  As well, the 
interaction was brief and minimally intrusive; the 
accused was mature and sophisticated (he was 
employed by the Government of British Columbia); 
and he knew he could say no to the police, since he 
later refused to consent to a search of his vehicle. As 
well, all of the accused’s documents had been 
returned to him by the police officer.
PHASE 3: Investigative Detention
The test for investigative detention requires a 
minimum threshold of reasonable grounds to 
suspect an individual is involved in recent or 
ongoing  criminal activity. These detentions typically 
arise from the dynamics of unpredictable street 
encounters that escalate, and not from mature 
investigations. A reasonable suspicion imports both 
an objective and subjective component. “The totality 
of the circumstances existing  at the time the 
detention commenced is to be considered as to 
whether the suspicion was reasonable,” said Justice 
Steel. “Although each factor giving  rise to reasonable 
suspicion may appear innocent when viewed by 
itself, a combination of factors viewed together may 
warrant further investigation.  Each fact or indicator 
ought not to be separated out for isolated assessment 
where the police are involved in fluid and fast-paced 
law enforcement, making  quick decisions on limited 
information.” And a judge is entitled to consider a 
police officer’s training  and experience in 
determining  objective reasonableness. What may 
appear to be innocent to the general public may 
have a very different meaning  to an officer 
experienced in drug  operations. For example, many 
indicators of potential drug  couriering  are innocent 
standing alone.  
Although the answer to the officer’s question (“Is 
there a big  drug  problem in B.C.?”) by itself would 
not be sufficient to raise a reasonable suspicion 
triggering  the accused’s detention after he was told 
he was free to leave, there was much more. The 
question and answer was layered upon everything 
that preceded it.  The officer observed the body 
language that accompanied it, which included lack 
of eye contact and hands shaking  violently. Plus he 
had “the nonsensical explanation provided by the 
accused for his unusual travel plans; the police 
officer’s knowledge that drug  transporters try to 
avoid any demonstrated connection to known 
source provinces like British Columbia and that 
rental cars are often used to transport illegal drugs; 
the fact that the vehicle appeared lived-in; the 
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accused’s physical demeanour – lack of eye contact, 
nervousness; and the officer’s past experience and 
training.” There were reasonable grounds to suspect 
that the accused was involved in transporting  drugs 
and his detention for investigative purposes was 
warranted. Even though no crime had been reported, 
the police can detain to undertake an investigation 
in circumstances where the police reasonably 
suspect, but do not know that criminal activity has 
taken place or is taking  place. There is no need to 
have an actual known crime under investigation. But 
the reasonable suspicion cannot just be of any bad 
behaviour. There must be a reasonable suspicion of 
specific criminal activity which gives rise to the 
grounds to detain.  
The Search
A search incidental to an investigatory detention has 
been limited to safety-related concerns.  The search 
power does not extend beyond safety concerns to 
search for evidence or contraband. This restricted 
search authority is based on a presumption that there 
will be a physical search of a person, vehicle, or 
bag. However, the police also possess a common 
law power to search using  drug  sniffer dogs on the 
basis of a reasonable suspicion.  Reasonable 
suspicion has the same meaning  for the purposes of 
ss.8 and 9 of the Charter. And the Court of Appeal 
noted the following  concerning  reasonable 
suspicion:
• a reasonable suspicion means something  more 
than a mere suspicion and something  less than a 
belief based upon reasonable and probable 
grounds;  
• a hunch based on intuition gained by 
experience does not by itself constitute a 
reasonable suspicion;  
• there must be objective grounds which support 
the opinion of the police officer. These objective 
grounds must be factual elements beyond 
subjective belief which can be adduced into 
evidence and permit an independent judicial 
assessment;
• to determine whether the reasonable suspicion 
standard is met in a given case, the totality of 
the circumstances must be considered;  
• there is no fixed checklist of factors which serve 
as prerequisites for a reasonable suspicion; 
• the reasonableness of a police officer’s 
suspicions should be assessed through the lens 
of common sense and practical experience 
rather than by resort to pre-ordained lists of 
indicators deemed adequate to justify a search.  
The potential meaning  of the factors relied on as 
the basis for a reasonable suspicion must be 
assessed for their collective, as opposed to 
individual, significance.
 
The investigative power to detain on a reasonable 
suspicion and the investigative power to deploy a 
sniffer dog  to search for drugs on a reasonable 
suspicion are analytically distinct. Because the 
police have no right to conduct a sniff search as an 
incident of an investigative detention, any such sniff 
search must be independently justifiable. Before a 
sniff search is undertaken the police must have a 
reasonable suspicion that the person who is the 
target of the search is illegally in possession of drugs. 
Since a reasonable suspicion can trigger both an 
investigative detention and a sniff search, sometimes 
there will be an overlap between detention and 
search. Sometimes the same facts which justify an 
investigative detention will also justify a sniff search.  
On the other hand, circumstances warranting  a 
detention will not always or necessarily empower 
the police to conduct a dog  search.  Justice Steel 
stated:
 
There must be an independent, lawful basis for a 
search if it is to be Charter compliant.  In this 
case, the sniff search must be independently 
justifiable in the sense that there is a reasonable 
suspicion that the accused was illegally in 
possession of drugs.  In other cases, that lawful 
basis might be, for example, a warrant, a search 
incident to arrest, a search incident to detention 
or a search by consent. In each case, the search 
power is not unlimited.  There must be a nexus 
between a particular individual and the crime 
under investigation so there cannot be a 
generalized search.  For example, an arrest for 
shoplifting would justify a search of the 
offender’s backpack, but not a rectal search.  
Similarly, a search incident to detention is not 
unlimited.  If detention is the legal basis for the 
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search, then the police can only search for 
officer safety.
What the Supreme Court of Canada has done in 
Kang-Brown is carve out another basis for a 
search based on reasonable suspicion which 
applies to cases where the police are using 
investigative tools such as sniffer dogs.  It is a 
legal basis for a search that is independent of the 
detention.  There may be two bases for 
conducting a search, a search incidental to 
detention and a search based on reasonable 
suspicion alone, which allow the use of an 
investigative tool.
It is important to remember that even if there 
was a reasonable suspicion to ground both the 
investigative detention and the search, they must 
both have been carried out in a reasonable 
manner. Where, as in this case, an investigative 
detention exists concurrent with the reasonable 
suspicion to justify the use of the sniffer dog, that 
sniff search may impact on the validity of the 
detention.  Consequently, the length of the 
investigative detention must be relatively brief 
and minimally intrusive.  So, even if there is a 
reasonable suspicion so as to allow the dog sniff, 
if the detention is prolonged unreasonably in 
order to accommodate the dog sniff, the 
i nve s t i g a t i ve d e t e n t i o n m ay b e c o m e 
unreasonable. [paras. 105-108]
Here, the accused’s detention was not unduly 
prolonged for the purpose of carrying  out the 
search. There were no untoward delays; the dog  sniff 
was conducted quickly and unobtrusively. There was 
no issue made of the dog’s reliability or accuracy.  
Although the trial judge erred in concluding  the dog 
sniff was not a search, she was satisfied that the 
police had reasonable grounds to suspect the 
accused was couriering  drugs before they 
commenced the search. Thus, the warrantless search 
of the vehicle by the sniffer dog  did not breach s.8 of 
the Charter because the police officer had an 
objectively verifiable, reasonable suspicion that the 
accused was involved with drug  trafficking  and the 
dog sniff was carried out in a reasonable manner.
 The accused’s detention was not arbitrary, the search 
was not unreasonable, and the accused’s appeal was 
dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
RELEASE OF SIN INFO TO 
POLICE AGENCIES
Service Canada has signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding  (MOU) with the RCMP, and other 
police forces have signed a MOU through the 
RCMP. The MOU allows police to obtain 
information from the SIR under s.139 (5) of the EI 
Act in order to accurately identify someone, to 
return lost or stolen property, or to notify next of kin 
that the holder is deceased. 
Police agencies (local, provincial, RCMP) may 
request SIN information, or have SIN confirmation 
from the RCMP  in Ottawa. RCMP will only accept 
requests from Police Departments for SIN enquiries 
through CCBSIN@rcmp-grc.gc.ca. Police officers 
mut provide the following information:
1. Their name, Police agency, address and phone 
number;
2. Indicate the reason for their request 
3. Indicate if the information is needed for court 
purposes (affidavit required).
The purpose must be to accurately identify 
individuals, locate next-of-kin, or to locate the 
rightful owner for found assets.
LEGALLY SPEAKING:
Defence Tactics Challenging a Warrant
“Once again, we see how 
these ITOs are meat to be 
d e v o u r e d b y d e f e n c e 
counsel.  Every word is 
parsed, ever y possible 
i n f e r e n c e d i s m i s s e d , 
credulity is suspended.  These warrants are often 
obtained in a compressed time frame.  ...  Counsel, at 
its leisure, can parse them to death.” - British 
Columbia Provincial Court Judge Doherty in R. v. 
Byron, 2009 BCPC 146, at para. 6.
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‘GROUNDLESS’ ARREST 
UNLAWFUL: EVIDENCE 
EXCLUDED 
R. v. Noel, 2010 NBCA 28
 
A police officer, accompanied by a 
specially trained drug-sniffing  dog, 
observed a vehicle traveling  at a 
speed slightly in excess of the posted 
limit. He decided to stop the vehicle 
and warn its driver. A license plate query indicated 
“no record found”, and the accused was pulled over. 
The officer told the accused, and sole occupant, that 
he had been stopped for the purpose of checking  his 
vehicle’s registration certificate, there being  no 
record for its license plate. The accused explained 
that the vehicle was a rental and handed over the 
rental agreement. He also produced his driver’s 
license when asked. The officer saw two cell phones 
and some food wrappers in the vehicle, but no 
luggage. The officer returned to his patrol vehicle 
and realized that the vehicle’s return date was nine 
days overdue. Efforts were made to call the rental 
company, but they were unsuccessful. The officer 
then walked back to the accused’s vehicle to advise 
him that efforts were ongoing  to contact the rental 
company and that the investigative process would 
take a little longer. Once at the window the officer 
said he was “hit” by an odour of raw marihuana. But 
he did not confront the accused about the odour. 
Instead, he obtained a phone number from the 
accused to call for rental details. A second officer, 
arriving  to assist, contacted the rental company 
identified in the rental agreement and was advised 
that the accused remained authorized to operate the 
vehicle.  
The accused was arrested for “possession of 
marihuana” and removed from the rental vehicle. A 
search of the passenger compartment was negative. 
However, the smell of raw marihuana was getting 
stronger during  the search of the back seat area. The 
trunk was opened and a closed duffel bag 
containing   numerous vacuum-sealed plastic bags of 
marihuana was located. It was later determined that 
there were 56 bags, each weighing  slightly more 
than half a pound, for a total of 30.8 pounds (14 
kilograms) of marihuana. After the marihuana was 
discovered, the officer put his dog  through a drug 
sniffing  exercise for training  purposes. The dog 
pointed to the presence of drugs in the trunk. The 
accused was then released from custody at the 
roadside after promising  to appear in court. He was 
charged with possession of marihuana for the 
purpose of trafficking. 
 
At trial in New Brunswick Provincial Court the 
officer said that when he first approached the 
vehicle from the passenger side he did not smell 
marihuana. But on his second approach in the same 
place just a few minutes later “he was hit with a 
smell of raw marihuana,” the sole basis for the 
accused’s arrest. He also did not ask the second 
officer, who arrived on scene, to corroborate the 
odour. Nor did he deploy his drug  sniffing  dog  prior 
to the arrest and search. The trial judge refused to 
accept the officer’s evidence that he detected an 
odour of raw marihuana from the vehicle. The officer 
noted no suspicious odour during  the initial contact, 
yet on the second visit to the vehicle, in exactly the 
same conditions as the first encounter, he noticed an 
odour of raw marijuana. There was nothing  to 
explain this. Furthermore, the trial judge reviewed 
some of the officer’s other court cases where his 
sense of smell failed him - drugs were found in 
vehicles but no odour was noted. The judge rejected 
the officer’s key testimony that he smelled raw 
marihuana from the vehicle’s interior, concluded the 
arrest was “groundless”, and that the follow-up 
search had been undertaken on a mere “hunch”. 
Since the arrest was unlawful, the incidental search 
was also unlawful and unreasonable under s.8 of the 
Charter. The evidence was excluded under s.24(2) 
and the accused was acquitted.
The Crown then appealed the accused’s acquittal to 
the New Brunswick Court of Appeal. It submitted 
that the trial judge erred by relying  on other cases 
the officer was involved with, facts which were not 
part of the evidentiary record. Chief Justice Drapeau 
agreed that the trial judge did err in using 
information outside the evidential record. But he 
also concluded that the judge’s rejection of the 
officer’s testimony concerning  the smell of 
marihuana was not tied to this information. Thus, the 
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accused’s acquittal was not a product of this 
extraneous information.
Chief Justice Drapeau acknowledged that had the 
trial judge believed the officer when he said he 
smelled raw marihuana then reasonable grounds 
would have existed. The Court of Appeal then 
recognized there were two avenues by which the 
officer could have searched the trunk; (1) with 
warrant and (2) without warrant. 
Search With Warrant
On this method, Chief Justice Drapeau stated:
The Criminal Code provides a potential avenue 
of relief for RCMP highway patrol officers who 
believe that an indictable offence has been 
committed and that it would be impracticable to 
appear personally before a Provincial Court 
judge to make application pursuant to s. 487 for 
a warrant to search a vehicle stopped at 
roadside. Section 487.1 is on point and provides 
that they may apply for a warrant by telephone 
or other means of telecommunication. That 
provision applies to indictable offences under 
the CDSA by virtue of s. 11(2) of that statute. 
Nothing  in the record suggests that both 
processes under s. 487 and s. 487.1 were 
unavailable to [the officer]. Had he obtained a 
search warrant, whether under s. 487 or s. 487.1 
by means of [a] cellular phone, the onus would 
have been on [the accused] to establish the 
search of his vehicle was “unreasonable” within 
the meaning of s. 8  of the Charter. As is well 
known, meeting that onus is relatively difficult 
having  regard to the deference owed by the 
reviewing court to the issuing judge’s decision. 
[para. 37]
However, the officer did not pursue a search with 
warrant. 
Search Without Warrant
 
Since the officer proceeded without a warrant, the 
onus shifted the burden of establishing  the search’s 
reasonableness to the Crown. This could have been 
established if the Crown could demonstrate that the 
arrest was authorized under s.495 of the Criminal 
Code:  
Section 495(1) states that a peace officer may 
arrest without warrant a person who has 
committed an indictable offence or who, on 
reasonable grounds, he or she believes has 
committed or is about to commit an indictable 
offence. It also authorizes a peace officer to 
arrest without a warrant a person whom he or 
she finds committing any criminal offence. ... 
[para. 39]
Here however, the accused contended, as the trial 
judge found, that the officer acted without the 
reasonable grounds required by s.495(1). The Court 
of Appeal concluded that the Crown failed to show 
that the judge’s error in referencing  the extraneous 
information in her reasons ultimately caused her to 
reject the officer’s evidence that he detected the 
odour of raw marihuana. Since the trial judge found 
the arrest groundless, it was unlawful as was the 
warrantless search, which breached s.8  of the 
Charter. The Crown’s appeal to overturn the 
accused’s acquittal was dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org 
LEGAL LESSON LEARNED
Search With Warrant:
When the police search with a warrant the search 
is presumed valid and the accused has the onus of 
establishing the search was unreasonable within 
the meaning of s.8 of the Charter. Since a 
reviewing judge owes deference to the issuing 
judgeʼs decision, this can be a relatively difficult 
onus to meet for the accused. 
Search Without Warrant:
When the police search without a warrant the 
search is presumed unreasonable and the Crown 
has the onus of establishing the search was 
reasonable within the meaning of s.8 of the 
Charter. In cases of searching as an incident to 
lawful arrest the Crown will need to demonstrate 
the arrest was authorized, which will include 
establishing that the arresting officer had the 
requisite reasonable grounds. 
 
Source: R. v. Noel, 2010 NBCA 28
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HATE CRIMES RISE
In June 2010 Statistics Canada released a report 
entitled “Police-reported hate crime in Canada, 
2008”.  Highlights of the report include:
• There was a 35% increase in hate crimes. In 
2008  there were 1,036 crimes motivated by 
hatred towards a particular group, up from 765 
crimes reported in 2007.
• Almost half of all police-reported hate crimes 
were mischief offences such as graffiti on public 
property. Three in 10 hate crimes involved 
violence. Two homicides were reportedly 
motivated by hate in 2008.
• The most common motivation for hate crime was 
race or ethnicity (55%), followed by religion 
(26%) and sexual orientation (16%). 
• Among  racially-motivated hate crimes, Blacks 
were the most targeted (37.3%), followed by 
South Asian (11.7%), East and Southeast Asian 
(8%), Arab or West Asian (6.7%), Caucasian (4%), 
and Aboriginal (3.6%). 
• Among  religious-motivated hate crimes, Jewish 
was the most targeted (64.2%), followed by 
Catholic (11.7%) and Muslim/Islam (10.1%). 
• Youth or young  adults accounted for a 
disproportionate number of accused persons. In 
2008, 59% of persons accused of hate crime 
were between 12 and 22 years of age. Most were 
male.
What is hate crime?
“There are four Criminal Code offences that are 
considered to be hate crimes: advocating genocide, 
public incitement of hatred, wilful promotion of 
hatred and mischief in relation to religious property. 
In addition, other offences, such as assaults or 
threats, may be classified as hate crimes if the 
incidents are determined to have been motivated by 
bias based upon race, national or ethnic origin, 
language, colour, religion, sex, age, mental or physical 
disability, sexual orientation or any other similar 
factor.”
Source: Statistics Canada, 2010, “Police-reported hate crime in 
Canada, 2008”, catalogue no. 85-002-X, Vol. 30, no. 2 at page 6.
Top 3 Hate Crime Motivations
 Race or ethnicity                 55%
 Religion                               26%
 Sexual orientation                16%
Source:  Statistics Canada, 2010, “Police-reported 
hate crime in Canada, 2008”, catalogue no. 
85-002-X, Vol. 30, no. 2 at page 15.
TOP 10 HATE CRIME RATES
CENSUS METROPOLITAN AREAS (CMA)
CMA Rate per 100,000
London,ON 8.2
Guelph,ON 8.2
Kingston,ON 7.7
Brantford,ON 6.9
Vancouver,BC 6.3
Hamilton,ON 6.3
Kitchener,ON 6.1
Abbotsford-Mission,BC 5.9
Ottawa,ON 5.6
Vancouver, BC 3.5
84%
BC
40%
QC
37%
ON
• Between 2007 and 2008, British Columbia, 
Quebec, and Ontario reported increases, up by 
84%, 40%, and 37% respectively. 
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Ontario Court of Appeal
????????? ???????? ??? ??? ?????????? 
???????
After almost completely cutting off 
the victim’s toe, the accused was 
convicted in the Ontario Superior 
Court of Justice by a jury for 
aggravated assault by maiming. However, he appealed 
to the Ontario Court of Appeal arguing that he was 
wrongly convicted of aggravated assault because there 
was no evidence of maiming. The Court of Appeal 
disagreed.  The victim testified that he was unable to 
take on his assailant, and although his toe was 
subsequently reattached, he was left permanently 
without feeling  in it. The accused’s conviction and six 
year sentence less pre-sentence custody was upheld.  - 
R. v. Stehniy, 2010 ONCA 269
Ontario Court of Appeal
????? ?????? ?? ????? ???? 
????????? ? ???????? ????????
Fo l l ow i n g a h a n d - t o - h a n d 
transaction with an undercover 
officer, the accused was arrested 
within 60 seconds of the take-
down signal being given by the officer to the 
surveillance team. Police searched him but could not 
find the marked $20 bill the officer used to pay for the 
crack, nor did he have the baggy with the chunk of 
crack that the officer said the accused had and from 
which he had broken off the piece that he sold to the 
undercover officer. A search of the area for the buy 
money and the drugs was unsuccessful. And none of 
the surveillance officers saw the accused discard 
anything. The accused was known to the officers and 
recognized by them. The Ontario Superior Court judge 
considered the missing  money and drugs in the baggy, 
but because the officers knew the accused, she did not 
find that the missing  items raised a reasonable doubt 
about identity. The accused was convicted of trafficking 
in crack cocaine.
On appeal to the Ontario Court of Appeal, the 
accused’s conviction was set aside. Although she was 
satisfied with identity, “the trial judge did not address 
the question whether it had been proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the transaction actually 
occurred,” said the Court of Appeal. “None of the 
[surveillance] officers observed the hand-to-hand 
transaction. ...  Most significantly, however, the failure 
to find the buy money and the drugs on the [accused] 
or after a search, together with the lack of opportunity 
for the [accused] to dispose of these items, is 
unanswered evidence that speaks against the 
transaction having  occurred.” An acquittal was entered. 
- R. v. Liban, 2010 ONCA 329
Alberta Court of Appeal
?????????? ? ????????? ??????? ??????? 
??????
A police officer testified that he saw 
the accused swallow “spit ball” 
packages of crack cocaine followed 
by bottled water. An Alberta 
Queen’s Bench judge found the arresting  officer had 
reasonable and probable grounds to arrest the accused. 
the officer subjectively believed he had grounds for 
arrest and, based on his training  and his observation of 
the accused’s actions, had objectively reasonable 
grounds for it. As a result, evidence seized during  the 
search subsequent to arrest was held to be admissible 
at the trial. This included cocaine residue on a knife 
and on empty candy containers, bundles of money 
totalling approximately $2,300, and a cell phone. 
Callers to the cell phone placed orders using terms 
synonymous in the drug trade with cocaine. The 
accused was convicted of several offences including 
possessing cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and 
possessing proceeds of crime (cash). 
The accused challenged his convictions to the Alberta 
Court of Appeal, arguing, in part, that the arresting 
officer’s view of the accused was obscured. He said the 
arresting  officer could not have seen the nature of the 
substance going  into his mouth because he put the 
container “directly to his mouth”. But Justice Picard, for 
Jurisprudence Jolt
IN BRIEF: This section provides a peek of what’s happening in appeal courts across the country.
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the Court of Appeal, disagreed. The arresting officer 
said he saw the accused swallow three or four pieces of 
crack cocaine. And there was no evidence that the 
accused put the container directly to his mouth in a 
manner that would totally obscure what he was 
ingesting. The trial judge used the correct test for 
warrantless searches. The accused’s appeal was 
dismissed.  - R. v. Tran, 2010 ABCA 119
Ontario Court of Appeal
?????????? ???????? ?? ??? ?????? 
??? ???????? ?? ???????
The accused was acquitted of 
producing marihuana and  bribery. 
On the production charge, the trial 
judge found that the accused’s 
Charter rights under ss.9, 10(a) and 10(b) were 
breached. The accused had language problems and 
she could not be given her ss.10(a) and (b) rights 
without the assistance of an interpreter. The accused’s 
statements to police, including what she said during 
her arrest where she offered money to avoid the arrest, 
were excluded.  
The Crown appealed the acquittals to the Ontario 
Court of Appeal. The Court ruled that the judge 
considered the relevant circumstances on the s.9 issue 
and that there was no basis to interfere with the trial 
judge’s discretion to exclude the statements on the 
Charter breaches as they related to the production of 
marijuana charge.  The the Crown’s appeal from that 
acquittal was dismissed.  However, on the bribery 
charge the accused’s statements were admissible as the 
gravamen of the bribery offence.  Despite the Charter 
breaches, the accused was not insulated from liability 
for her subsequent criminal act.  A detained person will 
still attract criminal responsibility for crimes committed 
by words e.g. threatening  death or offering  a bribe even 
though their Charter rights were violated.  Citing  an 
earlier case which found that “[s.10(b)] has as its object 
the provision of counsel to those under investigation 
for crimes already committed in order that they might 
be advised with respect to making disclosure, the 
provision of evidence, etc. regarding  of those crimes, 
[s.] 10(b) cannot possibly relate to crimes yet to come.” 
This rationale applied equally where there was a s.9 
breach as well as breaches of s.10 of the Charter said 
the Court.  The statements here constituted the actus 
reus of the bribery offence and did not flow causally 
from the Charter breaches. The acquittal on the bribery 
charge was set aside and a new trial was ordered on 
that charge alone. - R. v. Ha, 2010 ONCA 433
British Columbia Court of Appeal
???????? ???? ????????? ?????????? ??????
 
Police executed a search warrant 
on a two-level home. The upper 
and lower floors were occupied by 
the accused, his wife and their four 
children. In the crawl space police found the accused 
and his wife attending a 625 plant grow operation. A 
ventilation system with filters to mask the smell of 
marihuana was installed and an electrical bypass was 
found. The potential yearly revenue was estimated at 
$587,000 to $991,000. The accused and his wife were 
convicted of producing  marihuana, possession for the 
purpose of trafficking, and electricity theft. They were 
given 12 month conditional sentences and the 
accused’s interest in the house was forfeited to the 
Crown. 
The accused then appealed the forfeiture order to the 
British Columbia Court of Appeal. He submitted that 
the forfeiture of the house would have an adverse 
impact on his two youngest children and should have 
been considered by the trial judge under s.19.1(4)(a) of 
the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act. He argued 
that the word “continues” found in that section did not 
mean continuous. But Justice Frankel said it did. 
“[Section 19.1(4)(a)] does require continuous (i.e., 
uninterrupted) principal residency,” he said. But it does 
not require continuous physical occupancy by an 
immediate family member throughout the entire 
relevant period. The offender seeking relief against 
forfeiture of a dwelling  house on the basis that the 
order would have an adverse impact on a member of 
his immediate family must persuade a court that such 
immediate family member existed. This requires 
evidence and there was no onus on the Crown to 
establish that s.19.1(4) did not apply. Because the 
accused lacked the necessary evidence, the Court of 
Appeal found that s.19.1(4) was not engaged. - R. v. 
Bui, 2010 BCCA 279
Ontario Court of Appeal
?? ???? ?? ???? ?? ????????? ? ?? 
???????? ???? ???? ??????
The accused was charged with 
over 80mg%.  At trial, the Crown 
called the arresting officer  and the 
Intoxilyzer technician who had 
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made the breath demand and operated the Intoxilyzer. 
The Certificate of a Qualified Technician was also filed 
as an exhibit. The accused also testified and called two 
witnesses, a friend who was drinking with him and a 
toxicologist.   The evidence was that the accused and 
his friend had been eating dinner at a restaurant 
together for almost five hours, and the accused had 
drank six bottles of light beer. Based on calculations, 
the toxicologist testified that on the basis of the 
accused’s version of events that his BAC would have 
been between 11mg% and 68.mg% when he was 
stopped by the police, about one hour after he left the 
restaurant.  The trial judge found the evidence of the 
accused and his friend to be unreliable as to the 
amount of alcohol consumed, disbelieved the evidence 
to the contrary, and convicted the accused. An appeal 
to the Ontario Superior Court of Justice was dismissed. 
A further appeal to the Ontario Court of Appeal was 
also dismissed. Although the trial judge erred in relying 
on the circumstances of the breath testing  to bolster the 
reliability of the test results so the presumption of 
accuracy applied, the Crown not only filed a certificate 
of analysis but also called viva voce testimony of the 
Intoxilyzer technician to prove the Intoxilyzer results. 
Therefore, there was no need to rely on the 
presumption of accuracy.  It was therefore not an error 
for the breathalyzer results to be taken into 
consideration when assessing the credibility of 
thedefence evidence because the presumption of 
accuracy was not being  relied on. - R. v. Chow, 2010 
ONCA 442
SHINING FLASHLIGHT 
THROUGH TINTED CANOPY 
WINDOW NOT A SEARCH
R. v. Grunwald, 2010 BCCA 288
Two police officers set up a motor 
vehicle check stop to detect possible 
motor vehicle infractions.  The 
accused, who was driving  a Toyota 
pick-up with a canopy that had tinted 
windows, was stopped at about 11pm. One officer 
smelled marihuana while obtaining  the accused’s 
driver’s licence, but he did not see anything  inside 
the cab of the truck.  He conducted a radio check of 
the driver’s licence.  A second officer walked around 
the truck to check the insurance decal on the rear 
licence plate. He also smelled marihuana and, after 
confirming  that the insurance decal was current, 
began to investigate the smell. He looked into the 
bed of the truck with his flashlight and saw garbage 
bags. One of the bags was open at the top and he 
could see a Ziploc bag  of marihuana inside. He was 
investigating  the smell and was not concerned with 
officer safety. He then went to the driver’s door of 
the truck and told the accused that he was under 
arrest for possession of marihuana. The truck took off 
and the officers were able to stop the accused a 
short distance away.  He was arrested, given his s.
10(b) right to counsel, and the truck was 
searched.  The officers found $400,000 in the cab 
and 42 lbs of marihuana bud, worth approximately 
$110,000, in the back of the truck in 80 Ziploc bags 
contained within the garbage bags. They also found 
six cell phones, various cell phone cards, 
calculators, and a notebook containing scoresheets.
At trial in British Columbia Supreme Court the judge 
found that the accused’s s.8  Charter  right had been 
breached when the officer shone his powerful 
flashlight (15,000 candle power) into the truck bed 
through the tinted windows. The accused’s arrest and 
the search of his vehicle were both unlawful. 
However, the judge admitted the evidence under s.
24(2). The accused was convicted of possessing 
marihuana for the purpose of trafficking.
The accused then appealed his conviction to the 
British Columbia Court of Appeal arguing, among 
other grounds, that because his rights under the 
Charter were breached the evidence should have 
been excluded under s.24(2).  The Crown, on the 
other hand, argued there were no breaches. 
s.9 - Arbitrary Detention
Although random traffic check stops infringe a 
person’s right to be free from arbitrary detention 
under s.9, they are justifiable pursuant to s. 1 of the 
Charter.  Thus, there was no Charter breach as a 
result of the initial stop of the vehicle. But the 
accused contended that if a police officer wishes to 
investigate something  unrelated to a motor vehicle 
infraction, they must have reasonable grounds to 
embark on such an investigation and, in this case, 
once the officer started investigating  the smell of 
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marihuana the justification for the initial stop 
expired.  Since a different investigation commenced 
in the course of the stop, he suggested the detention 
was no longer justified under s.1.  
The Court of Appeal rejected this submission. If a 
police officer has a lawful and reasonable basis to 
stop a vehicle, the fact there are other reasons to 
effect a stop does not necessarily transform the stop 
into an arbitrary detention. Here, the accused was 
stopped in a road check and was still being 
investigated pursuant to that stop when the officer 
found the marihuana with his flashlight. “There was 
no shifting  of the purpose for detention,” said Justice 
Bennett. “The initial detention was lawful and the 
fact that one officer pursued a new avenue of 
investigation while the original investigation was 
ongoing  did not transform the detention into one 
which is arbitrary.”  
s.10(b) - Right to Counsel
The accused argued that upon being  stopped, the 
police were required to advise him of his right to 
counsel pursuant to s.10(b) of the Charter and once 
again when the ‘new’ investigation into the smell of 
marihuana began. The Court of Appeal also rejected 
this submission. Generally, motor vehicle stops do 
not require police to advise the detainee of their 
right to counsel before an investigation proceeds.  
Although s.10(b) is engaged, the police need not 
advise the detainee of the right to a lawyer because 
the breach is saved by s.1  of the Charter as a 
justifiable limit prescribed by law:
Therefore, there was no violation of [the 
accused’s] right to counsel when he was stopped 
at the road check.   I have already agreed with 
the trial judge that there was never a second 
detent ion.  Accordingly, there was no 
requirement for the constable to advise [the 
accused] of his right to counsel before he looked 
into the back of the truck. These are fact-specific 
determinations, and where, as here, the person 
is properly detained, the fact the officer looked 
about does not change the nature of the 
detention.  The nature of the detention changed 
when [the officer] saw the marihuana. [The 
officers] acted appropriately and in accordance 
with [the accused’s] Charter rights when this 
occurred. [The officer] saw the marihuana and 
immediately arrested [the accused]. [Police] 
advised him of his right to counsel, once his 
vehicle was stopped. [para. 28]
s.8 -  Search and Seizure
The examination of the interior of a vehicle during 
the course of a traffic stop, using  a flashlight, did not 
constitute an unreasonable search.  The police are 
entitled to use flashlights to carry out their 
inspection of vehicles and drivers at night, as well as 
to aid in their safety. But, on the other hand, the 
police cannot use a random check stop to pursue an 
“unfounded general inquisition or an unreasonable 
search”.  
Here, “the visual inspection in this case was not a 
necessary incident to the check stop.” said Justice 
Bennett. “At the time that [the officer] shone his 
flashlight through the back window, he had finished 
with his business of inspecting  the vehicle for Motor 
Vehicle Act violations.” Even so, there was no 
search. The accused did not have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the items in the back of his 
truck which were visible through the canopy 
window. The totality of the circumstances here did 
not found an objectively reasonable expectation of 
privacy:
• it is well-established that there is a reduced 
expectation of privacy in a vehicle; 
• driving  is a heavily regulated activity, and 
motorists should and do know that while on 
the road, they are subject to police traffic 
stops, traffic cameras, streetlights, and the eyes 
of other curious drivers;
• the marihuana was in plain sight. The canopy 
had windows, albeit tinted. However, it was 
possible to see through the tinting  and to view 
the contents of the truck bed, as the officer did. 
The officer’s use of the flashlight to see through the 
tinted canopy window did not render the contents of 
the truck out of plain sight. Nor did using  the 
flashlight transform the officer’s visual inspection 
into a search:
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In my view, common sense 
tells us that the police, 
working at night, will have 
occasion to use flashlights 
in the ordinary course of 
their duties. It is not 
objectively reasonable to 
expect that they would 
not. When the police are 
lawfully where they are 
permitted to be, the use of 
ar t i f ic ia l i l luminat ion 
should not automatically 
constitute a search. [para. 
39]
And further:
[P]lain view is not limited to daytime hours. If a 
flashlight is used to see what would be visible in 
daylight hours, such as objects in the back of a 
pickup truck or the interior of a motor vehicle, 
the item does not cease to be in plain sight when 
the sun goes down.
If the use of an ordinary flashlight to look 
through the window of a car does not constitute 
a search, as I have decided, then I cannot see 
how the use of a flashlight 
to look through a tinted 
window does. It would be 
absurd to tell police officers 
that they can use their 
flashlights to look through 
clear windows but not 
tinted windows. If an officer 
attempts to look through a 
tinted window with his 
flashlight and sees nothing, then what is on the 
other side of the window is not in plain sight.  
[The accused’s] real complaint is that his 
window tinting was ineffective.
.........
A police officer is not required to avert his eyes 
when he comes across something suspicious that 
is unrelated to the investigation he is pursuing.  
In the circumstances of this case, where [the 
officer] had lawfully stopped the vehicle, where 
the smell of marihuana was obvious and the 
back of the truck was open to public view, [the 
officer] was entitled to look through the canopy 
window into the back of the truck.
In these circumstances, [the 
accused] had no reasonable 
objective expectation of privacy 
in the back of his truck. It 
follows that there was no search, 
and therefore no s. 8  violation. 
The officer saw the marihuana, 
which gave him reasonable 
grounds to believe that [the 
accused] was committing an 
of fence. He ar res ted [ the 
accused] and the marihuana was 
seized incidental to that arrest. 
[paras. 45-49]
The accused lacked a subjective 
expectation of privacy as well. 
Although he had an interest in keeping  the contents 
of his truck bed private - he used a canopy over the 
bed and tinting  on the windows and transported the 
marihuana at night - he knew that it was possible to 
see through the windows and that was a risk he 
took. “A wish for privacy is not the same as an 
expectation,” said Justice Bennett. The accused had 
no subjective expectation of privacy in the back of 
his truck.
Since there was no reasonable 
expectation of privacy, the officer 
looking  into the back of the truck 
with a flashlight and observing 
marihuana in plain sight was not a 
s.8  “search” and therefore there was 
no Charter violation. Thus there was 
no reason to resort to s.24(2). 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
“[C]ommon sense tells us that the 
police, working at night, will have 
occasion to use flashlights in the 
ordinary course of their duties.  It 
is not objectively reasonable to 
expect that they would not. When 
the police are lawfully where they 
are permitted to be, the use of 
artificial illumination should not 
automatically constitute a search.”  
“A police officer is not required 
to avert his eyes when he comes 
across something suspicious 
that is unrelated to the 
investigation he is pursuing. ”  
LEGALLY SPEAKING:
SEARCH ON ARREST
“The existence of reasonable grounds to believe 
the accused is in possession of weapons, or 
evidence, is not a pre-requisite to the existence of 
[the police power to search following arrest] so 
long as it is exercised for a valid purpose arising from the arrest 
and directed to the administration of justice.” -  British Columbia 
Provincial Court Judge Hicks in R. v. Nijjar, 2009 BCPC 192, at para. 17.
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TEST FOR REASONABLE 
GROUNDS NOT OVERLY 
ONEROUS
R. v. Wang, 2010 ONCA 435
A police officer saw the accused 
driving  in the center lane of a three 
lane highway. The vehicle swerved 
within her lane and crossed about six 
inches over the dotted lines that 
separated the three lanes of traffic on at least three 
occasions on each side. As well, the vehicle’s speed 
fluctuated. It slowed to about 60 km/h in a posted 
90 km/h zone and then would speed up to about 80 
km/h, then back to 60 km/h. The officer activated his 
emergency equipment and the accused was slow to 
pullover. An odour of an alcoholic beverage was 
coming  from the vehicle and, when she stepped out 
of the vehicle at the officer’s request, and odour of 
alcohol was isolated to her breath. Her face was also 
flushed. In response to questioning, the accused said 
she had one drink, then said maybe two drinks, that 
evening. She was arrested for impaired driving, 
given the breathalyzer demand, and provided 
samples of breath over the legal limit; 100mg% and 
90mg%.
At trial in the Ontario Court of Justice the accused 
argued that the officer did not have reasonable 
grounds to make the breath demand and therefore 
her rights under s.8 of the Charter were breached. 
The trial judge agreed. Although he found the officer 
had the subjective belief required to make the 
demand, that belief was not objectively supported 
by the facts. The judge noted 
that the accused was not 
speeding, there was no 
accident, and no jerky or 
violent motions. Nor were 
there any conventional or 
orthodox signs of impairment. 
There was no slurred speech 
and no glazed, glossy, glassy, 
unfocussed or bloodshot eyes. 
She was responsive to the 
officer’s questions, polite and 
cooperative, and the odour of 
alcohol was noticeable, but not strong. And she had 
no difficulty with her eye coordination and 
steadiness. The breathalyzer readings were excluded 
under s.24(2) and the accused was acquitted of 
impaired driving and over 80mg%. 
The Crown’s appeal to the Ontario Superior Court of 
Justice was successful. The appeal judge found the 
trial judge had mixed up the objective test with the 
subjective belief of the officer, thus applying  the 
wrong  legal standard to the facts in the case. Here, 
there was no issue that the officer subjectively had 
the requisite state of mind. What needed to be 
determined was whether the officer’s subjective 
belief was objectively reasonable. Since the trial 
judge applied the wrong  principles to the objective 
component of the reasonable grounds test, the 
accused’s acquittal was set aside and a new trial was 
ordered.
The accused then appealed to the Ontario Court of 
Appeal arguing  that, contrary to the finding  of the 
Ontario Superior Court, the trial judge did not err in 
his legal analysis of what constituted reasonable and 
probable grounds to make a breathalyzer demand
Reasonable & Probable Grounds
In deciding  whether the trial judge had properly 
applied the law in assessing  whether there was a 
sufficient objective basis for the officer’s subjective 
belief that he had reasonable and probable grounds 
to demand breath samples, Justice Rouleau, 
delivering  the unanimous judgment for the Court of 
Appeal stated: 
The test for deciding  whether 
t he r e a r e r e a sonab l e an d 
probable grounds includes both a 
subjective and an objective 
component: (i) the officer must 
have an honest belief that the 
suspect committed an offence 
under s. 253 of the Criminal 
Code, and (ii) there must be 
reasonable grounds for this belief. 
[reference omitted, para. 14]
And further:
“[W]here a court is satisfied that 
the officer had the requisite 
subjective belief, the sole 
remaining issue is whether that 
belief was reasonable in the 
circumstances. The test is not an 
overly onerous one.  A prima 
facie case need not be 
established.”  
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In short, ... where a court is satisfied that the officer 
had the requisite subjective belief, the sole 
remaining issue is whether that belief was 
reasonable in the circumstances. The test is not an 
overly onerous one. A prima facie case need not be 
established.  Rather, when impaired driving  is an 
issue, what is required is simply that the facts as 
found by the trial judge be sufficient objectively to 
support the officer’s subjective belief that the 
motorist was driving while his or her ability to do so 
was impaired, even to a slight degree, by alcohol. 
...
In the instant case, no issue is taken with the fact 
that the officer had the requisite subjective belief.  
Moreover, there is no controversy about the facts on 
which he based his belief.  The sole issue is whether 
his subjective belief was objectively reasonable in 
the circumstances.  ... I am of the view that the trial 
judge erred in concluding  that the officer’s 
subjective belief was not reasonable in the 
circumstances.
The facts, supporting a finding  that the officer’s 
subject ive bel ie f was reasonable in the 
circumstances were as follows:
(1) the [accused] was driving at widely varying 
speeds below the speed limit as slow as 60 
kilometres and as fast as 80 kilometres in a 90 
kilometres an hour zone;
(2) the [accused] was driving  in the middle lane of 
the three north bound lanes of the Don Valley 
Parkway and cars were passing  her on both 
sides;
(3) the [accused] was repeatedly swerving within 
and between the lanes;
(4) the [accused] continued to drive for a 
significant distance while being  signalled to 
pull over by police in a marked cruiser, first by 
flashing lights, then use of an electric air horn, 
and eventually by use of the car’s siren;
(5) when she was eventually stopped, the 
[accused] stopped in a live lane of traffic rather 
than on an available, albeit narrow, shoulder;
(6) there was an obvious odour of alcoholic 
beverage coming from the [accused’s] breath;
(7) the [accused’s] face was flushed; and
(8) when initially questioned by the officer, the 
[accused] admitted to having consumed one 
alcoholic beverage. When the officer expressed 
d i s b e l i e f , s h e ch a n g e d h e r a n s w e r 
acknowledging that she may have had two.
In my view, these facts are sufficient, at law, to 
objectively support the officer’s subjective belief 
that the {accused] was driving while impaired by 
alcohol. The fact that some of the traditional 
indicators of impairment, such as slurred speech 
and bloodshot eyes, were not present does not 
render the officer’s subjective belief, based on the 
signs he did observe, objectively unreasonable.   As 
a result, I would find that the officer had reasonable 
and probable grounds to make the arrest and make 
the breath demand and that the [accused’s] Charter 
claim must therefore fail. [references omitted, paras. 
17-21]
Since the breath demand was proper, there was no s.
8  Charter breach and therefore no need to address s.
24(2). The accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
“The test for deciding whether there are reasonable and probable grounds includes both a 
subjective and an objective component: (i) the officer must have an honest belief that the 
suspect committed an offence under s. 253 of the Criminal Code, and (ii) there must be 
reasonable grounds for this belief.”  
Subjective Belief Objective FactsReasonable
Grounds
Volume 10 Issue 3 - May/June 2010
PAGE 35
REASONABLE SUSPICION CAN 
BE COMMUNICATED BY OTHER 
OFFICER
R. v. Nahorniak, 2010 SKCA 68
A sergeant, engaged in preventative 
patrols throughout the camping  area 
at a music festival, was involved in 
stopping  individuals and checking 
vehicles to ensure drinking  and 
driving  laws were obeyed. At about 3:20 a.m. he 
approached a vehicle he saw turn into an alleyway 
between two tents. He detected an 
odour of alcohol coming  from the 
vehicle. The accused was in the 
driver's seat with a bottle of vodka 
between his legs. The sergeant 
asked the accused to come to the 
police vehicle. The accused did 
not stumble, stagger or slur his 
speech. He was coherent, polite, 
and co-operative. The officer could 
smell alcohol coming  from the 
accused, who said he had last consumed two drinks 
an hour before. The sergeant felt he had grounds to 
make an approved screening  device (ASD) demand, 
but did not have one with him nor was he qualified 
to use it. He radioed for a constable to attend with 
an ASD, told him what his grounds were, and asked 
him to administer the test. The constable attended to 
the accused seated in the back of the police vehicle, 
smelled alcohol, and gave the ASD demand. A fail 
reading  resulted and the accused was taken to the 
police detachment where two breath samples of 
120mg% and 100mg% were received.
At trial in Saskatchewan Provincial Court the 
accused argued that his Charter rights had been 
breached and that the Certificate of Analysis should 
have been excluded under s.24(2). He argued that 
neither the sergeant nor the constable possessed the 
reasonable suspicion needed to make an ASD 
demand and even if the sergeant did have the 
suspicion, the constable did not. The trial judge 
found that the sergeant reasonably suspected the 
accused had alcohol in his body, but that the 
constable did not. Neither of them had notes 
referring  to the information that was passed between 
them, nor did the constable testify that he was told 
that the accused had the vodka bottle between his 
legs or that he said he had been drinking  alcohol. 
The constable did not testify that the odour of 
alcohol was strong  or that the odour of alcohol 
came from the accused’s breath. And the constable 
took no additional steps in his investigation 
independent of the sergeant prior to making  the 
demand, readying  the device for use, or 
administering  the ASD test. Since the constable did 
not comply with the requirements of s.254(2) of the 
Criminal Code in administering  the ASD test, the 
accused’s s.8  Charter rights were violated and the 
Certificate of Analysis of the breath samples was 
excluded. The accused was 
acquitted of the impaired 
driving and over 80mg%. 
The Crown appealed to the 
Saskatchewan Court of 
Queen’s Bench. The appeal 
judge agreed with the trial 
judge that there had been a 
s.8  Charter breach because 
the constable had insufficient grounds to reasonably 
suspect the accused had alcohol in his body. 
Although the constable said he relied on the grounds 
relayed to him by the sergeant and was entitled to do 
so, he could not articulate them. The constable did 
not testify that he independently smelled alcohol on 
the accused’s breath nor had he been advised by the 
sergeant that the sergeant had smelled alcohol on 
the accused’s breath. However, because the appeal 
judge was not satisfied with the s.24(2) analysis, she 
set aside the acquittal and remitted the case back to 
the trial judge to conduct a redetermination of the 
appropriate remedy under s.24(2).
The Crown appealed to the Saskatchewan Court of 
Appeal arguing  there was no s.8  breach and, even if 
there was, the evidence of the Certificate of Analysis 
should not be excluded and a conviction entered. 
The accused also appealed submitting  that the 
appeal judge’s decision remitting  the case back for a 
new s.24(2) analysis should be set aside and the 
acquittal restored. 
“[R]easonable suspicion can be 
achieved either by the officer's 
personal knowledge and 
observation or the communicated 
observations of others or a 
combination of both.”  
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Reasonable Suspicion
Here, the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal concluded 
that the accused’s s.8  Charter rights had not been 
breached.  The constable was entitled to rely on the 
sergeant's observations without independent 
verification:
[R]easonable suspicion can be achieved either 
by the officer's personal knowledge and 
observation or the communicated observations 
of others or a combination of both. This is so 
even where the officer making the demand 
cannot precisely articulate the information 
conveyed to him but there is nevertheless other 
testimony or evidence of what was conveyed.
It is not necessary for an officer to independently 
investigate and verify grounds of reasonable 
suspicion conveyed to him as long as he 
subjectively believes them. For [the constable] 
specifically, it was enough that he knew the 
grounds and believed them at the time he made 
the demand and his belief was objectively and 
subjectively reasonable. In this case, [the 
constable] testified he relied on [the sergeant’s] 
grounds but also relied on his own observations 
to form his reasonable suspicion. [The 
constable] stated three reasons to suspect [the 
accused] had alcohol in his body. He assumed 
that [the sergeant] had proper grounds and made 
the demand because [the sergeant] asked him to. 
He relied on what [the sergeant] told him. 
Finally, he independently smelled alcohol 
coming from [the accused]. Although it would 
have been preferable for [the constable] to 
articulate the grounds [the sergeant] told him, 
his failure to do so was not fatal because [the 
sergeant] was able to articulate the details of 
what was conveyed.
In deciding whether an officer had grounds to 
make the demand and administer the test, a 
court must consider all the circumstances and 
evidence with respect thereto known to him 
when he made the demand. [references omitted, 
paras. 21-23]
In this case, both lower courts found that the 
sergeant had a reasonable suspicion. But by 
considering  only the grounds that the constable was 
able to articulate at trial and his independent 
investigation, the trial judge failed to consider all the 
evidence that was before him about the constable’s 
reasonable suspicion. Although the constable failed 
to testify that he had smelled alcohol on the 
accused’s breath, the sergeant told him that he had 
smelled it. Therefore, the constable’s failure to testify 
that he also smelled alcohol on the accused’s breath 
and take steps to satisfy himself that the smell was 
not originating  from a source outside the accused’s 
body did not matter. Justice Ottenbreit, delivering 
the unanimous Court of Appeal judgment, said this:
Mere failure to smell alcohol on a person's 
breath is not fatal to forming reasonable 
suspicion. In this case, [the accused] was in the 
back seat of a police cruiser. [The constable] was 
not obliged to sniff various parts of [the 
accused’s] body or the cruiser to eliminate all 
speculative scenarios such as the smell coming 
from the cruiser itself or only the clothes of [the 
accused] before he could have reasonable 
suspicion. Whether it is necessary to isolate the 
accused's breath as the source of the alcohol 
smell will depend on whether the source of the 
a l c o h o l s m e l l i s u n c l e a r g i v e n t h e 
circumstances. In this case it was obvious the 
smell was emanating from [the accused].
The smelling of alcohol on a person's breath, 
although cogent evidence of alcohol in the body, 
is not always the sine qua non of "reasonable 
suspicion." ... [T]he smell of alcohol on the 
accused's breath may be a sufficient condition of 
reasonable suspicion rather than a necessary 
one. [references omitted, paras. 26-27]
The Court of Appeal concluded that the constable 
had a reasonable suspicion to make the ASD 
demand and that there was no s.8  Charter breach. 
The Crown’s appeal was allowed, the Certificate of 
Analysis was admitted, and a conviction was 
entered. The matter was remitted back to the trial 
judge for sentencing.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
www.10-8.ca
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RAW MARIHUANA SMELL  
PERMITTED CONCLUSION 
DRIVER IN POSSESSION
R. v. Harding, 2010 ABCA 180
An Alberta police officer stopped a 
Dodge Durango sports utility vehicle 
with BC licence plates because the 
l i c e n c e p l a t e n u m b e r s a n d 
registration tag  were obscured by 
mud. The officer approached the passenger side of 
the Durango, saw the accused was the lone 
occupant, and observed two large hockey bags in 
the back compartment. At the passenger side 
window the officer smelled the very strong  odour of 
raw marijuana. The accused was asked for his 
driver’s licence, registration and insurance, and 
where he was coming  from and going  to. He handed 
over the requested documents and said he was from 
British Columbia and was going  to Edmonton. The 
officer decided to arrest the accused when he 
smelled the strong  odour of raw marijuana, but 
wanted to first find out as much information about 
the occupant of the vehicle as he could for officer 
safety reasons. A computer check revealed the 
accused had a criminal record and had been a 
person of interest in a suspected grow operation in 
British Columbia in 2001. Another officer arrived to 
offer assistance and the rental status of the vehicle 
was verified. The accused was told he was going  to 
be arrested. In response, he rolled up his side 
window, locked the doors, and made a call on his 
cellular phone. He was asked to exit the vehicle and 
complied. He was arrested for 
possession of marijuana. Police 
entered the vehicle and smelled a 
strong  and overpowering  odour of 
raw marijuana. The two hockey 
bags contained approximately 56 
pounds of raw marijuana. The 
accused was then read his Charter 
rights.
At trial in the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench the 
trial judge ruled that there were reasonable grounds 
(subjectively and objectively) for the warrantless 
arrest. The officer had experience in enforcing  drug 
laws, the vehicle had British Columbia plates (a 
province notorious for drug  production), two large 
bags were seen in the back of the vehicle, a strong 
odour of raw marijuana was detected, and the 
vehicle was a rental car (commonly used in the drug 
trade to avoid identification and detection). Even if 
there was an unreasonable search, the judge would 
have admitted the evidence in any event. The officer 
acted in good faith and any breach would not have 
been serious. The admission of the evidence would 
not render the trial unfair and the accused had a 
reduced privacy interest in the vehicle – he was not 
the owner. The accused was convicted of possessing 
marihuana for the purpose of trafficking. 
The accused then appealed to the Alberta Court of 
Appeal contending  that the arrest was unlawful, the 
search of the vehicle and seizure of the marihuana 
was unreasonable, and that his s.10(b) rights had not 
been provided in a timely fashion. Thus, in his view, 
the evidence should have been excluded. 
Arrest 
Under s.495 of the Criminal Code an arrest may be 
made without a warrant. This requires that an 
arresting  officer must have reasonable grounds on 
which to base the arrest. “The arresting  officer must 
personally believe that reasonable grounds exist and 
those grounds must, in addition, be justifiable from 
an objective point of view, i.e., a reasonable person 
placed in the position of the officer must be able to 
conclude that there were reasonable grounds for the 
arrest,” said the Alberta Court of Appeal. “In 
a s s e s s i n g  t h o s e g r o u n d s , t h e 
circumstances leading  to the arrest 
and the arresting  officer’s training  and 
experience must be considered.” Here, 
the accused conceded that the initial 
traffic stop was not arbitrary because 
of the obscured licence plate. And just 
because the officer was concurrently 
conducting  a traffic inquiry while 
observing  grounds for a drug  related 
offence did not make the detention arbitrary. 
The trial judge listed five circumstances which led 
the officer to arrest the accused for possession of 
marijuana:
“The smell of raw 
marijuana alone was 
sufficient to conclude 
that the [accused] was 
at that time in possession 
of marijuana.”  
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(a) his great deal of experience in enforcing drug 
laws and his “know how”;
(b) his observation of the Durango approaching 
from the west, traveling  east with licence 
plates from British Columbia, a notorious 
source of drugs; 
(c) seeing the two large bags in the back 
compartment of the Durango; 
(d) the powerful smell of marijuana noted by his 
well trained nose; and 
(e) concurrent ly wi th the 
a r o m a o f m a r i j u a n a 
e m a n a t i n g  f r o m t h e 
Durango, the determination 
that the vehicle was a rental 
car, commonly used by 
persons in the drug trade as 
part of their efforts to avoid 
identification and detection.
But the only relevant objective 
factor in the Court of Appeal’s 
view was the strong  odour of raw 
marijuana emanating  from the vehicle. The other 
factors were mere suspicions. The smell, however, 
did not permit the officer to ascertain the quantity of 
marijuana. Possession of more than 30 grams 
constitutes an indictable offence while 30 grams or 
less is only a summary conviction offence.
Without knowing  the quantity of marijuana, the 
officer could not have grounds to support a 
charge of possession for the purposes of 
trafficking. The smell of raw marijuana (or 
harvested marijuana as it is sometimes called) 
alone could only provide grounds for an arrest 
for simple possession, a summary conviction 
offence.
Section 495(1)(a) provides for arrest on 
reasonable grounds where the officer believes 
the person “has committed or is about to commit 
an indictable offence”. In this case in order to 
arrest on a summary conviction offence without 
warrant, section 495(1)(b) must apply. It provides 
that an officer may arrest “a person whom he 
finds committing a criminal offence”. [paras. 
21-22]
The question here then, was whether it was lawful to 
arrest a person for simple possession of marijuana 
under s.495(1)(b) as a person found committing 
based solely on the smell of marijuana. The Alberta 
Court of Appeal held that it was.
[The officer] smelled the very strong odour of 
raw marijuana, not burnt marijuana. The smell of 
raw marijuana, given [the officer’s] experience 
with marijuana, constituted the observation that 
a crime, namely, possession of marijuana, was 
being committed. No inference was necessary. 
T h e p o s s e s s i o n o f 
marijuana was not a past 
event and the officer did 
not need to infer that he 
c o u l d f i n d m o r e 
marijuana by searching 
the [accused] or his 
vehicle. The smell of raw 
mari juana alone was 
sufficient to conclude that 
the [accused] was at that 
time in possession of 
marijuana. [paras. 29]
“[The officer] smelled the very 
strong odour of raw marijuana, not 
burnt marijuana. The smell of raw 
marijuana, given [the officer’s] 
experience with marijuana, 
constituted the observation that a 
crime, namely, possession of 
marijuana, was being committed.”  
BY THE BOOK:
 s. 495(1) Criminal Code 
Arrest without warrant by peace officer
A peace officer may arrest without 
warrant
(a) a person who has committed an indictable 
offence or who, on reasonable grounds, he 
believes has committed or is about to commit 
an indictable offence;
(b) a person whom he finds committing a criminal 
offence; or
(c) a person in respect of whom he has reasonable 
grounds to believe that a warrant of arrest or 
committal, in any form set out in Part XXVIII in 
relation thereto, is in force within the territorial 
jurisdiction in which the person is found.
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Thus, the accused was lawfully arrested under 
section 495(1)(b).
Search
Since the arrest was lawful, the search and seizure of 
the marijuana was also lawful and there was no 
breach of s.8 of the Charter. Since there was a lawful 
arrest, the police were entitled to search the accused 
incidental to arrest and his vehicle; there was some 
rational connection between the offence for which 
the accused was arrested and the areas of the 
vehicle that the police searched.
Right to Counsel
The accused argued that his rights under s.10(b) of 
the Charter were breached because he was not 
informed initially of his Charter rights immediately 
upon the officer forming  his intent to arrest for 
possession of marijuana. Although s.10(b) requires a 
person, on arrest or detention, to be informed of 
their right to counsel, the words “without delay” (or 
“immediately”) are subject to concerns for officer or 
public safety. 
Here, the officer said he went to conduct a 
computer search into the accused’s background 
because of a concern for officer safety given his 
experience of the danger often associated with drug 
arrests. He also took what he estimated were a few 
minutes to ensure that the accused was lawfully in 
possession of the rental vehicle before arresting  him. 
“In these circumstances, the arresting  officer had 
reasonable concerns for his own safety and the delay 
in informing  the [accused] of his rights to counsel 
did not violate section 10 of the Charter,” said the 
Court of Appeal.
Section 24(2) Analysis
Even if the police delay in informing  the accused of 
his right to counsel was a breach, the evidence 
should nonetheless be admitted. The time delay was 
minor and the officer acted in good faith. He 
honestly believed he had grounds for arrest based on 
the smell of raw marijuana but did not immediately 
do so because of officer safety concerns. The impact 
of any breach was not serious and resulted in no 
prejudice to the accused. During  the delay, no 
evidence was conscripted nor did the accused 
provide any inculpatory statements. And the physical 
evidence was reliable. Its exclusion would tend to 
undermine the truth-seeking  function of the justice 
system and render the trial unfair from the public 
perspective, thus bringing  the administration of 
justice into disrepute.
The accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca
CIRCUMSTANCES OF ACCIDENT 
CAN FORM PART OF OFFICER’S 
OPINION OF IMPAIRMENT
R. v. Watson, 2010 BCCA 270
 
Just before 1:00 a.m. two people in a 
large family group walking  to their 
hotel from a pub were hit by a car 
driven by the accused. Family 
members approached the car and 
told the accused not to leave and he was punched at 
least once in the face. A police officer arrived on 
scene and, after checking  the injured, spoke with the 
accused. On request, the accused produced his 
driver's licence from the dashboard of the vehicle 
without any difficulty. The officer smelled a 
moderate odour of alcohol coming  from the 
accused's breath and noted that his eyes were red 
and watery. He also had a fat lip from where he had 
been punched earlier. His speech was slurred and 
his face was red. The accused was then asked to step 
out of the vehicle. His balance was poor - he was 
unsteady and swaying  on his feet and swaying  a little 
while walking. But his turning  was good and he had 
no difficulty getting  into the police vehicle. Based on 
his observations and the information he had 
received from the family members, the officer 
formed the opinion that the accused was impaired. 
The accused was given the breath demand and 
subsequently provided samples of his breath over 
the legal limit. He was charged accordingly.
At trial in British Columbia Provincial Court the 
judge ruled the breath demand was lawful. In his 
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view the factors open to the officer to consider in 
forming his grounds were:
(a) a motor vehicle accident where two 
pedestrians are hit in circumstances where the 
officer is told the vehicle never slowed down 
and never took evasive actions such as braking 
to avoid the collision;
(b) a moderate smell of alcohol from the 
accused's breath;
(c) red and watery eyes;
(d) slurred speech;
(e) a flushed face;
(f) swaying a little while walking;
(g) others saying  it was their opinion the accused 
was drunk;
(h) no difficulty producing driver's licence, no 
difficulty getting  into the police vehicle, and 
the accused being polite and cooperative. and 
the test results were admissible. 
The judge rejected a defence submission that the 
officer only considered what the family members 
had told him about the accused’s sobriety in 
reaching  his opinion. Rather, the officer had the 
subjective belief necessary for the demand as well as 
the objective grounds. The breathalyzer results were 
admitted and the accused was convicted of over 
80mg%, contrary to s.253(b) of the Criminal Code. 
Two counts of impaired driving  cause bodily harm 
were dismissed.
The accused then appealed to the British Columbia 
Court of Appeal arguing  the trial judge erred in 
finding  that there was an objective basis for the 
officer’s opinion that the accused’s ability to operate 
a motor vehicle was impaired by alcohol. Justice 
Kirkpatrick, delivering  the unanimous opinion, 
disagreed. Here, the trial judge considered not only 
what the officer was told to him at the scene, but 
also the officer’s own observations: 
[The officer] testified as to the chaotic scene he 
encountered on arrival at the collision site. He 
noted that the weather and road conditions were 
dry. He observed no skid marks on the road in 
the area of the collision indicative of braking. He 
saw damage on the right front end and 
windshield of [the accused’s] car. He observed 
[the accused] in the driver’s seat of the car and 
two cans of beer in the centre console which he 
initially testified were both open. Under cross-
examination, he readily conceded that the can 
next to the driver was unopened.
[The officer] testified that he spoke with the 
upset family members, examined the accident 
scene, and spoke with [the accused], at which 
time he detected the smell of alcohol on his 
breath, noted his red and watery eyes, slurred 
speech, and flushed face. It is obvious reading 
[the accused’s] evidence as a whole that it was 
“as a result of those observations and the 
information” he received from “the people 
milling about” that [the officer] formed his 
opinion that [the accused’s] ability to operate a 
motor vehicle was impaired by alcohol. [paras. 
10-12]
Although the officer did not specifically state that the 
circumstances of the accident formed part of his 
grounds of belief, he testified as to his observations 
of the accident. It was the totality of his observations 
that informed his opinion. 
The accused’s contention that the objective basis for 
the grounds had innocent or non-culpable 
explanations was also rejected. The fact that the 
scene of the collision was dark and a distance from 
the nearest intersection, the roadway was paved and 
there was no suggestion that the car had left the 
roadway, and no account for why the pedestrians 
were walking  on the wrong  side of the roadway did 
not render the accident irrelevant in the officer’s 
assessment of the grounds to demand a breath 
sample. This suggestion was unrealistic given that 
two pedestrians had been struck by the accused’s car 
with no evidence of braking, which was consistent 
with the family members’ account. Nor did innocent 
explanations offered for red, watery eyes, flushed 
face, and slurred speech negate the officer’s opinion 
of impairment. If this were the case, the court would 
be isolating  the objective observations of impairment 
and the circumstances of the accident from 
consideration. Instead, the British Columbia Court of 
Appeal concluded there was evidence to support the 
police officer’s opinion of impairment. The accused’s 
appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
